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Regulating Jolly Roger: The Existing and
Developing Law Governing the
Classification of Underwater Cultural
Heritage as “Pirate-Flagged”
Peter Hershey
10 U. MASS. L. REV. 94
ABSTRACT
This article explores the existing law governing Underwater Cultural Heritage
(UCH) which is classified as “pirate-flagged.” First, this article discusses the
discovery of the Whydah Galley, an 18th century slave trader vessel, which was
captured by pirate Captain Samuel Bellamy and transformed into the flagship of his
pirate fleet, and the subsequent discoveries of additional “pirate-flagged”
shipwrecks, including the international regulatory scheme governing ownership of
the property on these sunken vessels. This article discusses both 20th century
international conventions which define piracy and historic case law which clarifies
these definitions. Then, the article analyzes both the early American and
contemporary American applications of the definition of piracy in the courts. This
article concludes by evaluating the various approaches which may be used to define
piracy, and thus classify a vessel as “pirate-flagged,” with an eye towards future
opportunities for application of this definition and its implications on UCH which
has yet to be found. The spelling and syntax of much of the source material is
maintained as it originally appeared at the time of its publication.
AUTHOR NOTE
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

n February 1716, pirate Captain Samuel Bellamy and his crew
captured the slave trader Whydah Gally (the “Whydah”)—a threemast, 300-ton galley ship—off the coast of the Exuma Islands in the
Bahamas.1 Bellamy declared the Whydah his new flagship, armed her
with additional cannon and shot, staffed her with 130 men, and, soon
thereafter, set sail for mid-coast Maine (which was at that time part of
the colony of Massachusetts). On April 16, 1717, en route to Maine,
the ship encountered into a fierce storm off the coast of Cape Cod, ran
aground, capsized, and broke apart in the surf. The hull and its
contents were scattered across a debris field stretching four miles in
length. Bellamy, and all but two of his crew, perished.2
In July 1984, more than 250 years after its wreck, underwater
archeologist Barry Clifford and his dive team discovered the remains
of the Whydah.3 This discovery, which unveiled a debris field filled
with gold and silver jewelry and currency, cannon, grenades and other
weaponry, the ship’s bell, tableware, nautical equipment, human
remains, and a host of other items,4 was the first documented
encounter with underwater cultural heritage (“UCH”) that belonged to
or was under the dominant authority and control of pirates at the time
of its sinking—i.e., the first documented encounter with what this
article will refer to as “pirate-flagged UCH.”5
Since 1984, more than a dozen claims have been made concerning
the discovery of alleged pirate-flagged UCH. For example, in 1996,
Intersal, Inc. announced that it had found the remains of the Queen
Anne’s Revenge, the flagship of notorious pirate captain Edward Teach
1

2

3

4
5

BARRY CLIFFORD & KENNETH J. KINKOR, REAL PIRATES: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF THE WHYDAH FROM SLAVE SHIP TO PIRATE SHIP 76 (2007); COLIN
WOODARD, THE REPUBLIC OF PIRATES 156-58 (2007).
CLIFFORD, & KINKOR supra note 1, at 7, 130-32, 144; WOODARD, supra note 1,
at 169-193.
See generally BARRY CLIFFORD & PAUL BERRY, EXPEDITION WHYDAH: THE
STORY OF THE WORLD’S FIRST EXCAVATION OF A PIRATE TREASURE SHIP AND
THE MAN WHO FOUND HER (2000).
CLIFFORD & KINKOR, supra note 1, at 9-10, 36, 54.
For a generally accepted definition of underwater cultural heritage, see the
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Nov. 2,
2001, 41 I.L.M. 40, art. (1)(1)(a) [hereinafter the “2001 UNESCO Convention”].
See discussion infra Part II(A).

98

UMass Law Review

v. 10 | 94

(or Thatch, i.e. Blackbeard) in Beaufort Inlet, off the coast of North
Carolina.6 More recently, Barry Clifford and his team made discovery
claims to several wrecks off the coast of Madagascar believed to be the
Adventure Galley and Rouparelle, two ships that sailed under the
command of William Kidd,7 and the Mocha Frigate, a vessel
captained by an acquaintance of Kidd’s named Robert Culliford.8
Others have boasted of the discovery of the Quedagh Merchant—
another of Kidd’s vessels—off the coast of the Dominican Republic;9
Captain Henry Morgan’s Satisfaction off the coast of Panama;10 Sir
Francis Drake’s ships Elizabeth and Delight off the coast of Panama;11
the Port-au-Prince, a legendary pirate ship that sank off the coast of
6

7

8
9

10

11

Richard W. Lawrence & Mark Wilde-Ramsing, In Search of Blackbeard:
Historical and Archaeological Research at Shipwreck Site 0003BUI,
SOUTHEASTERN GEOLOGY, Vol. 40, No. 1, at 1 (February 2001); ANGUS
KONSTAM, THE HISTORY OF SHIPWRECKS 144-45 (2002); WOODARD, supra note
1, at 255.
Mary Ann Bragg, P’town Explorer Heading to Pirate Ships, CAPE COD TIMES,
August 19, 2010, http://www.capecodtimes.com/article/20100819/News
/8190316; RICHARD ZACKS, PIRATE HUNTER 139-159, 203-222 (2003).
Bragg, supra note 7; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 161-180.
Sean McLachlan, Captain Kidd’s Pirate Ship to Become Underwater Museum,
GADLING (May 7, 2011), http://gadling.com/2011/05/07/captain-kidds-pirateship-to-become-underwater-museum/; Captain Kidd Ship Found, LIVE SCIENCE
(Dec. 13, 2007); http://livescience.com/2132-captain-kidd-ship.html; ZACKS,
supra note 7, at 203-222.
Chris Bickford, Captain Morgan’s Pirate Ship Found, DISCOVERY (Nov. 27,
2012); STEPHEN TALTY, EMPIRE OF BLUE WATER: CAPTAIN MORGAN’S GREAT
PIRATE ARMY, THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAS, AND THE CATASTROPHE
THAT ENDED THE OUTLAWS’ BLOODY REIGN 219 ( 2007).
FIRST COAST NEWS, St. Augustine Pirate Museum Founder Pat Croce Has
Found Sir Francis Drake’s Shipwrecks, Oct. 24, 2011, http://www
.firstcoastnews.com/news/article/223922/483/St-Augustine-Pirate-MuseumFounder-Pat-Croce-Has-Found-Sir-Francis-Drakes-Shipwrecks;
SUSAN
RONALD, THE PIRATE QUEEN: QUEEN ELIZABETH I, HER PIRATE ADVENTURERS,
AND THE DAWN OF EMPIRE 255, 2008). There exists widespread dispute as to
whether captains such as Henry Morgan and Francis Drake were, in fact, pirates.
Compare TALTY, supra note 10, at 35-36 (pirates and/or privateers) with
RONALD, supra note 11, at xix (pirates) with WOODARD, supra note 1, at 2
(privateers). Because these men are often alleged to have committed piratical
acts, we have included them in the aforementioned list. For assistance in
determining whether the wreck sites of ships commanded by Morgan, Drake, or
other similarly situated persons should be categorized as “pirate-flagged,” see
infra Part V.
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Tonga in the Polynesian Islands;12 and the La Marquise de Tourny, a
ship purportedly used for piratical activities that sank in the English
Channel off the coast of Plymouth, England.13
In addition to these empirical examples, significant potential for
new discoveries—or purported discoveries—of pirate-flagged UCH
exist. For example, in Beauford Inlet, Blackbeard intentionally sank
one of his sloops of war, which has yet to be located.14 Sir Francis
Drake lost more than a dozen ships during his voyages around the
Americas, especially off the coasts of North Carolina and Panama.15
Captain Henry Morgan lost four ships in addition to the Satisfaction in
a storm near the Lajas Reef off the coast of Panama.16 Charles Vane
shipwrecked his flagship off the coast of Honduras.17 Indeed, the
historical record is replete with wrecked vessels, or other items lost at
sea, which were, at least arguably, owned by or under the dominant
authority and control of pirates at the time of their demise.18 Moreover,
because pirates continue to operate in seas worldwide, there exists

12

13

14

15
16
17

18

Divers Find Wreck of Legendary Pirate Treasure Ship, THE TELEGRAPH, August
9, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific
/tongafrenchpolynesia/9463622/Divers-find-wreck-of-legendary-pirate-treasureship.html.
Wreck of a Feared 18th Century French Pirate Ship Found Off Plymouth, THE
HERALD, Nov. 16, 2010, http://www.plymouthherald.co.uk/Wrecked-feared18th-century-French-pirate-ship-Plymouth/story-12694548-detail/story.html.
Recounted in Bonnet Trial, infra note 236, at 45; CHARLES JOHNSON, A
GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES 76-77 (Manuel Schonhorn ed.,University of
South Carolina Press 1972) (1724). There is a current dispute among scholars as
to the identity of the author of A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES. One
scholarly theory attributes authorship of the work to Daniel Defoe, the author of
ROBINSON CRUSOE, writing under the pen name of Captain Charles Johnson.
Several subsequent re-printings of the work attribute the work to Defoe,
including the 1972 edition edited by Manuel Schonhorn cited here. For the
purposes of this article, authorship shall be attributed to Charles Johnson.
RONALD, supra note 11, at 248-255, 280-90.
TALTY, supra note 10, at 219.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 308. Vane was eventually captured, and tried and
convicted of committing acts of piracy. Id. at 309-10.
See, e.g., WOODARD, supra note 1, at 19, 20 (pirate captain Avery burns and
sinks vessels under his authority and control); id. at 153 (pirate captain John
Martel wrecks and sinks ships off the coast of St. Croix); id. at 158 (identifying
dozens of pirate shipwrecks off the coast of Nassau, Bahamas); id. at 174 (pirate
captain Sam Bellamy intentionally sinks a ship under his command).
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continuing potential for the creation of what will eventually become
pirate-flagged UCH.19
There can be little doubt that international law recognizes the
historical, social, and scientific value of pirate-flagged UCH, and,
therefore, requires its protection and preservation.20 But the clarity
ends there. Despite the increasing number of purported discovery
claims, and in contrast to the attention received by other classifications
of UCH,21 significant gaps and ambiguities in the international
regulatory scheme governing the wrecks of pirate ships still exist. This
article focuses on one such gap—namely, whether, and if so, how, the
laws of piracy in a criminal context interact with and/or apply to the
laws governing the preservation of UCH. The questions abound: Can
there be such a thing as pirate-flagged UCH? Does this classification
fit within the international regulatory scheme established for the
preservation of UCH? If so, what types of UCH fall within its scope?
Before UCH can be classified as “pirate-flagged,” must the owner of
the vessel, or the captain and/or members of the crew, be convicted of
piracy? What if the owner/captain/crew took the King’s Pardon, or
were the subject of an official proclamation? This article will analyze
and assess these and other issues involving the classification of UCH
as “pirate-flagged.”
The analysis will begin by exploring the constitution of, and the
international regulatory scheme governing, underwater cultural
heritage. In so doing, it will focus on whether the classification of
UCH as “pirate-flagged” fits within the current regulatory framework.
After determining that such a classification is both consistent with
current law and appropriate in certain cases, the analysis will turn to
the parameters of classifying UCH as pirate-flagged. Because this
classification necessarily involves or relates to acts of piracy, the
analysis will briefly examine the historical evolution of the criminal

19
20

21

See, e.g., United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012).
See, e.g., the 2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5; U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea arts. 149 & 303, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (hereinafter
“UNCLOS” or the “1982 Convention”).
See, e.g., Sea Hunt v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 221 F.3d 634 (4th
Cir. 2000); Int’l Aircraft Recovery v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned
Aircraft, 218 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d
212 (3rd Cir. 1992); and Hatteras v. The U.S.S. Hatteras, 698 F.2d 1215 (5th
Cir. 1982).
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laws of piracy in order to assess whether, and if so how, these laws
should be applied in the UCH context. The analysis will conclude by
applying these observations to the wreck site of the Whydah.
II. PIRATE-FLAGGED UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE: IS SUCH
A CLASSIFICATION CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW?
In its current form, international law encompasses two distinct
concepts that provide a basis for the recognition of pirate-flagged
UCH. The first is the idea that UCH—objects of archeological and
historical nature found at sea—are worth protecting and preserving.22
The second is that of a “pirate ship;” what customary international law
generally defines as a vessel used in the commission of acts of
piracy.23 These two concepts overlap in at least one instance: the
discovery of UCH that belonged to or was under the dominant
authority and control of pirates at the time of its sinking. The
following will demonstrate that the combination of these concepts for
purposes of categorizing UCH is not only consistent with the current
international regulatory scheme but also useful in determining the
rights and obligations of parties with respect to certain types of UCH.
A. The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage in the Law
of the Sea
From 1973 to 1982, state representatives met in New York at the
third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The resulting
convention—the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (the “1982
Convention”)—was the first multi-lateral convention to recognize that
member States have a continuing obligation “to protect objects of an
archeological and historical nature found at sea.”24 In addition, Article
149 of the 1982 Convention provided that: “[a]ll objects of an
archeological and historical nature found in the Area [i.e., the
international commons] shall be preserved or disposed of for the

22

23

24

See, e.g., the 2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5; UNCLOS, supra note
20, at arts. 149 and 303.
See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 20, at art. 303; Convention on the High Seas art.
17, April 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter “the 1958 High Seas
Convention”].
UNCLOS, supra note 20, at art. 303.
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benefit of mankind as a whole.”25 The 1982 Convention has remained
in force since November 16, 1994, has more than 160 member States,
and is widely considered to represent customary international law (in
most respects, at least).26
In 2001, building upon the protections recognized by the 1982
Convention, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) formed the Convention on the Protection of
the Underwater Cultural Heritage (the “2001 UNESCO Convention”)
in order “to ensure and strengthen the protection of underwater cultural
heritage.”27 To assist in this endeavor, Article (1)(1)(a) of the 2001
UNESCO Convention defined “underwater cultural heritage” to mean
all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or
archaeological character which have been partially or totally under
water, periodically or continuously, for at least 100 years such as:
(i) sites, structures, buildings, artefacts and human remains,
together with their archaeological and natural context; (ii) vessels,
aircraft, other vehicles or any part thereof, their cargo or other
contents, together with their archaeological and natural context;
28
and (iii) objects of prehistoric character.

The 2001 UNESCO Convention entered into force on January 2,
2009, but has not to date enjoyed the extensive support for which
many had hoped; at present, it has only forty-five members States.29
However, while certain provisions of the convention have caused
objection and concern over such things as “creeping coastal state
jurisdiction,”30 the 2001 UNESCO Convention’s definition of

25
26

27

28
29

30

Id. at art. 149.
See, e.g., United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Anastasia
Strati, Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, in UNRESOLVED ISSUES
AND NEW CHALLENGES TO THE LAW OF THE SEA: T IME BEFORE & T IME AFTER
21 (Strati ed., 2006).
2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, at art. (2)(1); see also Ole Varmer,
Closing the Gaps in the Law Protecting Underwater Cultural Heritage on the
Outer Continental Shelf, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 251, 253, 261 (2014).
2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, at art. (1)(1)(a).
States Parties: About the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater
Cultural Heritage, UNESCO.ORG, www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO
=13520&language=E&order=alpha (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
See Ole Varmer et al., United States: Responses to the 2001 UNESCO
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 5 J. MAR.
ARCHEOLOGY 131 (2010).
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“underwater cultural heritage” is, with the exception of its centurial
requirement, consistent with prior, more widely adopted conventions
concerning the preservation of historic resources.31 Perhaps the most
comparable example is the Convention on the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage (the “1972 UNESCO Convention”).
That convention, which had 190 member States at the time of this
writing, defines cultural heritage as including the following:
[M]onuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture
and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature,
inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which
are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of
history, art or science;
[G]roups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings
which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their
place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the
point of view of history, art or science;
[S]ites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man,
and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding
universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or
32
anthropological point of view.

As seen above, while international conventions such as the 1972
UNESCO Convention and the 1982 Convention, along with the
domestic laws of many coastal States (including the United States),
appear to call for the protection of historical, cultural, and scientific
resources that are not yet 100 years of age, few, if any, laws or
regulations exist which impose a greater age requirement. In other
words, international and state law, by and large, agree with Article
(1)(1)(a)’s proposition that objects meeting the requirements set forth
therein constitute UCH, even if other authorities extend their
protections to items of a younger age.33 For this reason, among others,

31

32

33

See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 V.S.T. 37.
States Parties: About the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater
Cultural Heritage, UNESCO.ORG, www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO
=13520&language=E&order=alpha.
Compare the 2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, at art. (1)(1)(a) (object
must be at least 100 years old) with the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431 et seq.
(no express age requirement); the Archeological Resources Protection Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 470aa-mm (object must be at least 100 years old); National Historic
Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 et. seq. (objects must be at least 50 years old);
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the 2001 UNESCO Convention is a helpful tool, and a persuasive
authority, in assessing whether objects found at sea constitute UCH.34
Applying the applicable provisions of the 1982 Convention and the
2001 UNESCO Convention to objects of archeological and/or
historical value that were, at the time of sinking, owned by or under
the dominant authority and control of pirates (e.g., the Whydah and its
contents) leaves little doubt that such items are afforded protection
under the current international regulatory scheme.
B. Pirate Ships in the Law of the Sea
In April 1958, state representatives met in Geneva, Switzerland, at
the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in order to
“codify the rules of international law” relating to the seas.35 The
codifications that emerged were separated into four conventions: the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the
Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, and the
Convention on the High Seas.36 The last of these, the Convention on
the High Seas (hereinafter the “1958 High Seas Convention”), was the
first multi-lateral international convention to set forth a cognizable
definition of “pirate ship.”37 Article 17 of the 1958 High Seas
Convention provides:
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is
intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the
purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 15
[defining acts of piracy]. The same applies if the ship or aircraft
has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under
38
the control of the persons guilty of that act.

34

35
36
37
38

National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1431 et. seq. (no express age
requirement); RMS Titanic Memorial Act of 1986, 16 U.S.C. §§ 450 rr-450 rr-6
(no express age requirement).
See Varmer, supra note 27, at 261 (“The 2001 UNESCO Convention is now
considered by many nations, archaeologists, and legal experts to provide the
minimum standards and requirements for protecting UCH.”).
See, e.g., 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23.
See LOUIS B. SOHN ET AL., LAW OF THE SEA IN A NUTSHELL 2-3 (2d ed. 2010).
1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 6.
Id.

2014

Regulating Jolly Roger

105

The Convention has remained in force since September 30, 1962,
and has approximately sixty member States, including the United
States.39
The 1982 Convention adopted the 1958 High Seas Convention’s
definition of pirate ship with only minor stylistic changes. 40 Article
103 of the 1982 Convention states:
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is
intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the
purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101
[defining acts of piracy]. The same applies if the ship or aircraft
has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under
41
the control of the persons guilty of that act.

The 2001 UNESCO Convention does not set forth a separate or
distinct definition of pirate ship for use in the UCH context. It does,
however, provide in Article 3 that:
Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction
and duties of States under international law, including the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This Convention shall
be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner
consistent with international law, including the United Nations
42
Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The definitions of “pirate ship” codified in the 1958 High Seas
Convention and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea are silent
as to their applicability to UCH (due most likely to the fact that both
were formed prior to the adoption of a cognizant definition of UCH).43
However, Article 3 suggests that the definitions are properly applied to

39

40
41
42
43

1958 High Seas Convention, supra, note 23. For a list of signatories to the
convention, see Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 29 April 1958, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx
?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-2&chapter=21&lang=en (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 61.
Id.
2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, at art. 3.
As seen above, these conventions were adopted in 1958 and 1982, respectively,
whereas the 2001 UNESCO Convention was adopted in 2001. Cf. Varmer,
supra note 27, at 254-55 (reciting the evolution of the terminology used to
describe, and the standards used to protect, historic artifacts, including those lost
at sea).
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UCH, at least in circumstances where a sufficiently definitive
determination can be made as to whether the UCH belonged to or was
under the dominant authority and control of pirates at the time of its
sinking.
C. Sovereign Immunity as a Limitation on the Definition of
“Pirate Ship”
That UCH satisfies the aforesaid standards does not necessarily
mean that it should be classified as “pirate-flagged.” Instead, there are
several limitations recognized in the law of the sea that curb the
applicability of this classification, the most significant of which, for
our purposes, involves the concept of sovereign immunity.44 Sovereign
immunity, as applied to seafaring vessels, means that one State cannot
exercise authority and control over a public ship of another State
unless that other State expressly consents to the first State’s actions or
expressly abandons its rights and interests in the ship.45 Accordingly,
under both the 1958 High Seas Convention and the 1982 Convention,
sovereign vessels enjoy “complete immunity from the jurisdiction of
any State other than the flag State.”46
There are two types of public ships generally recognized in the law
of the sea. The first is the “warship.” The 1958 High Seas Convention
defines “warship” to mean
a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State and bearing the
external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the
command of an officer duly commissioned by the government and
whose name appears in the Navy List, and manned by a crew who
47
are under regular naval discipline.

44

45

46

47

Ownership claims by individuals or insurers to UCH wreck sites have
empirically been rare, if not non-existent. Despite this observation (and although
the topic is generally outside the scope of this article), it is worth noting that
such private property claims should not affect the classification of UCH as
pirate-flagged, but may, however, play a role in deciding whether salvage rights
should be granted to a non-owner.
See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 243-59 (4th ed. 2007).
UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 59 (immunity of sovereign warships); id. at 59
(immunity of vessels on “government non-commercial service”).
1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 59 (immunity of sovereign
warships); id. at 59 (immunity of vessels on “government non-commercial
service”).
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The 1982 Convention adopted a slightly broader definition of
warship:
“[W]arship” means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State
bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its
nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned
by the government of the State and whose name appears in the
appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew
48
which is under regular armed forces discipline.

The second type of public ship recognized by the 1958 High Seas
Convention and the 1982 Convention is classified as a “government
non-commercial service” vessel.49 While neither convention expressly
defines the constitution of such a vessel, this category presumably
includes vessels used for research, diplomatic, and police purposes,
among other functions.50
The concept of sovereign immunity surfaces in the instant analysis
in two important respects. First, as explained in Part III, public vessels
cannot, by definition, commit acts of piracy, nor can their crew, so
long as they remain under the authority and control of the sovereign or
its agents.51 Thus, under the current international scheme, no public
vessels under proper authority can satisfy the definition of “pirate
ship” set forth in either the 1958 High Seas Convention or 1982
Convention.
Second, even if an unauthorized individual or group were to
illicitly take actual control of a sovereign vessel and use the vessel to
commit acts of piracy, both the 1958 High Seas Convention and the
1982 Convention provide a mechanism for the sovereign to retain legal
authority and control over the ship. For example, both conventions
provide the following:
“The acts of piracy...committed by a warship, government ship or
government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the
ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship.”52
48
49
50

51

52

UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 34-35.
See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 59.
See, generally, JAMES BRADLEY, THE IMPERIAL CRUISE (2009) (recounting the
voyage of a vessel used for diplomatic purposes).
1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at
60-61.
1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5.; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at
60-61.

108

UMass Law Review

v. 10 | 94

Thus, crew who mutiny and commit, or attempt to commit piratical
acts using a sovereign vessel may be captured and tried as pirates.53
But, both conventions also firmly establish that this conceptual public
to private conversion is limited to the individual or individuals
committing the acts of piracy, and does not generally extend to the
vessel itself. Instead “[a] ship or aircraft may retain its nationality
although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of
nationality is determined by the law of the State from which such
nationality was derived.”54
Thus, regardless of whether a private individual uses a sovereign
vessel to commit acts of piracy, legal authority and control over the
public ship remain with the sovereign unless the sovereign expressly
states otherwise or has abandoned the vessel.55
An empirical example of the application of these principles to
shipwreck sites is found in the United States’ Sunken Military Craft
Act of 2004 (the “SMCA”).56 The SMCA makes it clear that the
United States retains legal authority and control over its “sunken
military craft” unless it has expressly abandoned said craft by law,
treaty, or other means. Section 1401 of the SMCA provides the
following:
Right, title, and interest of the United States in and to any United
States sunken military craft—(1) shall not be extinguished except
by an express divestiture of title by the United States; and (2) shall
not be extinguished by the passage of time, regardless of when the
57
sunken military craft sank.

53

54

55

56

57

1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5.; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at
60-61.
1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 6; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at
61.
1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at
61; see also 2001 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, at 4 (“Consistent with
State practice and international law, including the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying
the rules of international law and State practice pertaining to sovereign
immunities, nor any State’s rights with respect to its State vessels and aircraft.”).
Pub. L. No. 108-725, div. A. tit. XIV, 118 Stat. 2094 (codified at 10 U.S.C. app.
§ 113).
Id.
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In similar fashion to the definition of “warship” provided in both
the 1958 High Seas Convention and the 1982 Convention, the SMCA
defines the term “sunken military craft” to mean
all or any portion of—(A) any sunken warship, naval auxiliary, or
other vessel that was owned or operated by a government on
military noncommercial service when it sank; (B) any sunken
military aircraft or military spacecraft that was owned or operated
by a government when it sank; and (C) the associated contents of a
craft referred to in subparagraph (A) or (B), if title thereto has not
58
been abandoned or transferred by the government concerned.

Comparable schemes are also found in bi-lateral and multi-lateral
treaties and case law. For example, in Sea Hunt v. The Unidentified
Shipwrecked Vessel, the Fourth Circuit, in assessing the applicability
of the terms of the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations
between the United States and Spain, to two wreck sites off the coast
of Virginia, explained
[a]s sovereign vessels of Spain, LA GALGA and JUNO are
covered by the [treaty]. The reciprocal immunities established by
this treaty are essential to protecting the United States
shipwrecks . . . . Under the terms of this treaty, Spanish vessels,
like those belonging to the United States, may only be abandoned
59
by express acts.

The above observations support three general conclusions. First,
when assessing issues involving alleged pirate-flagged UCH, a
preliminary determination must be made, if possible, as to whether the
wreck is of a sovereign vessel—i.e., a warship or other ship
conducting government non-commercial service. Second, if sovereign,
the wrecked vessel cannot be adjudged pirate-flagged unless the laws
of the sovereign permit such a classification, or the sovereign has
expressly abandoned the vessel. Third, conversely, if permitted or
abandoned, a sovereign vessel may be classified as pirate-flagged if it
was taken over by unauthorized individuals who thereafter used, or
attempted to use, the vessel for piratical purposes until its sinking.
With these conclusions in mind, and using the 1958 High Seas
Convention, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the 2001
UNESCO Convention as a framework, the analysis will now shift to
58
59

Id.
Sea Hunt v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 221 F.3d 634, 638 (4th Cir.
2000).
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the question of how to determine whether a ship belonged to, or was
under the dominant authority and control of, pirates at the time of its
sinking.
III. DEFINING PIRACY: THE MODERN FRAMEWORK
Although use of the terms “pirate” and “piracy” or their
equivalents date to ancient times,60 neither term has historically
enjoyed the benefits of a precise definition. Due most likely to the
international nature of piracy and its impacts, many nations, including
the United States, have opted, in part, to define piracy and identify
those who commit piracy not pursuant to precise definitions, but in
accordance with “international law” or “the law of nations.”61 This
definitional fluidity lends difficulty to our analysis, but, as explained
infra, is inescapable in light of the historical evolution of the laws of
piracy. Yet, the law of nations has, within the last sixty years, taken a
shape less amorphous than its predecessors of past eras, at least with
respect to piracy and pirates.62 For this reason, this article begins with
the modern doctrine, which is found primarily in multi-lateral
international conventions and the criminal codes of coastal States.
A. Twentieth Century International Conventions
As with the term “pirate ship,” the 1958 High Seas Convention
was the first multi-lateral international convention to set forth a more
precise definition of “piracy” to be adopted and applied by member
States. Article 15 of the Convention provides the following:

60

61

62

Ryan Kelly, UNCLOS, But No Cigar: Overcoming Obstacles to the Prosecution
of Maritime Piracy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2285, 2288 (2011); TALTY; supra note
10, at 36; WOODARD, supra note 1, at 2.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1948) (“Whoever, on the high seas, commits the
crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into
or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.”).
See, e.g., 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 23, at 5; UNCLOS,
supra note 20, at 60-61.
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Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of
63
depredation,[ ] committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or
of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or
aircraft;
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
64
described in subparagraph 1 or subparagraph 2 of this article.

Rephrased in simpler terms, under the 1958 High Seas Convention,
piracy includes: 1) illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation
against another ship, or a person or property on another ship, when
such acts are accomplished for private ends; 2) voluntarily assisting in
the operation of a pirate vessel; and 3) inciting or facilitating an act of
piracy.65
The 1982 Convention adopted the 1958 High Seas Convention’s
definition of piracy with only minor stylistic changes. Article 101 of
the 1982 Convention provides as follows:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) [A]ny illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) [O]n the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) [A]gainst a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a
place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) [A]ny act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or
of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or
aircraft;

63

64
65

Depredation is “[t]he act of plundering; pillaging.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(8th ed.1999).
1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5.
Id. at 5.
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(c) [A]ny act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
66
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

In other words, the 1982 Convention reiterates that piracy includes:
1) illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation against another
ship, or a person or property on another ship, when such acts are
accomplished for private ends; 2) voluntarily assisting in the operation
of a pirate vessel; and 3) inciting or facilitating an act of piracy.67
The piracy definitions contained in the 1958 High Seas and 1982
Conventions are subject to two important limitations. First, as
indicated in Part II, “piracy” is limited to acts committed by those
aboard a “private ship.”68 Accordingly, neither sovereign vessels under
proper authority, nor crew acting within the scope of sovereign
authority, can commit acts of piracy.69 Second, “piracy” is limited to
acts committed on the “high seas.”70 Under the 1958 High Seas
Convention, the high seas constitute “all parts of the sea that are not
included in the territorial sea [up to twelve miles from shore] or in the
internal waters of a State.”71 Coastal States carry the responsibility for
defining piracies, or like crimes, occurring in their territorial and
internal waters.72 In light of the maritime jurisdictional framework
established by the 1982 Convention, a change in this scheme was
necessary.73 Accordingly, the 1982 Convention defines high seas to
consist of “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive
economic zone [up to 200 miles from shore], in the territorial sea [up
to twelve miles from shore], or in the internal waters of a State, or in

66
67
68

69
70

71
72

73

UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 60-61.
Id. at 60-61.
1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at
60-61.
See discussion supra Part II(C).
1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5; UNCLOS, supra note 20, at
60-61.
1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 2.
See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone arts. 1 and 2,
Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
See Peter Hershey, Regulating Davy Jones: The Existing and Developing Law
Governing the Interaction with and Potential Recovery of Human Remains at
Underwater Cultural Heritage Sites, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 363, 368-76
(2012) (defining and examining the various maritime jurisdictions recognized in
the law of the sea).
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the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”74 Under the 1982
Convention, as with the 1958 Conventions, coastal States carry the
responsibility for defining piracies, or like crimes, occurring in their
territorial and internal waters.75 However, the 1982 Convention leaves
ambiguous which, if any, definition of “piracy” is to be applied to acts
committed in the exclusive economic zone (the “EEZ”). On the latter
point, colorable arguments can be made that, for purposes of criminal
enforcement in the EEZ, flag States retain jurisdiction to define and
punish piratical acts aboard or using its ships in certain circumstances;
in other scenarios, citizen States retain jurisdiction to define and
punish piratical acts committed by its citizens; and, in all other
circumstances, the EEZ constitutes a “place outside the jurisdiction of
any State” such that Article 101’s definition is applicable.76
B. Piracy Under the Criminal Codes of Coastal States
The modern criminal codes of most, if not all, coastal States define
and address piracy to some extent. Some of these States have simply
adopted the definitions set forth by the 1958 High Seas Convention or
the 1982 Convention. For example, in the United Kingdom, the
Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act, passed by Parliament
in 1997, restates verbatim the definition of piracy provided in Article
101 of the 1982 Convention.77 Because this definition is limited to acts
occurring on the high seas, those who commit pirate-like acts in the
internal or territorial waters of the United Kingdom cannot be
prosecuted as pirates, and, instead, can be charged only with similar
crimes such as robbery, murder, or theft.78
Other States have adopted dual approaches to defining piracy. On
one hand, the criminal codes of these States recognize the international
nature of piracy by adopting, or adopting modified versions of, the
piracy definitions codified in the 1958 High Seas or 1982
Conventions, or by defining piracy according to “the law of nations.”79

74
75
76

77
78
79

UNCLOS, supra note 20, at 57.
Id. at 27.
Compare id. at 60-61 (defining piracy) with id. at 43-53 (setting forth the rules
applicable to activities in the EEZ).
Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act, § 26, sch. 5 (1997) (Eng.).
See, e.g., Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878, 41 & 42 Vict., c. 73 (Eng.).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1948).
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Such acts of piracy are generally subjected to universal jurisdiction—
i.e., any State can prosecute those who commit said acts “irrespective
of the presence of a jurisdictional nexus”80—but enforcement has
traditionally been limited to acts occurring on the high seas. 81 At the
same time, the codes of these States also identify certain other acts
that, while not necessarily recognized as acts of piracy under
customary international law, are so defined in the criminal laws of the
coastal State.82 To prosecute these acts as piracy, a jurisdictional nexus
to the coastal State is required; but, in return, enforcement may span,
in addition to the high seas, the territorial waters and contiguous zones
of coastal States, and possibly further, subject to flag State, citizen
State, and other jurisdictional limitations.83
Title 18 of the United States Code employs a dual approach to
defining piracy. On one hand, 18 U.S.C. § 1651 defines piracy
according to “the law of nations.”84 As with the 1958 High Seas and
1982 Conventions, piracy under § 1651 is limited to acts committed on
“the high seas.”85 At the same time, however, other provisions of Title
18 provide that those guilty of piracy also include: 1) citizens of the
United States who commit murder, robbery, or other acts of hostility
against the United States or its citizens on the high seas pursuant to
letters of marque or commissions issued by a foreign governmental
authority;86 2) seafaring foreign nationals who cruise against or make
war on the United States, its citizens, or its property, contrary to
treaty;87 3) seamen who, by violent means, prevent the captain or crew
80
81

82
83

84
85
86

87

United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 606 (E.D. Va. 2010).
See, e.g., 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 23, at 5; UNCLOS, supra note
20, at 60-61; 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1948).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1661 (1948).
For a more in-depth discussion on this topic, see, e.g., Blair v. United States,
665 F.2d 500, 504 (1981); United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35, 38 (1980).
18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1948).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948) (“Whoever, being a citizen of the United States,
commits any murder or robbery, or any act of hostility against the United States,
or against any citizen thereof, on the high seas, under color of any commission
from any foreign prince, or state, or on pretense of authority from any person is
a pirate....”).
18 U.S.C. § 1653 (1948) (“Whoever, being a citizen or subject of any foreign
state, is found and taken on the sea making war upon the United States, or
cruising against the vessels and property thereof, or of the citizens of the same,
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of a vessel from defending the vessel or its goods;88 and 4) those who
cruise or associate with piratical vessels that land and commit robbery
on shore.89 These provisions may be enforced against all those with a
sufficient jurisdictional link to the United States, and, except where
expressly indicated, are not limited to acts occurring on the high seas.
C. Interpreting and Applying Modern Piracy Laws
Two relatively recent cases demonstrate the difficulty courts face
in interpreting and applying these definitions to particular acts. In
United States v. Said, the defendants approached in a skiff and fired
shots at the USS Ashland—a Navy transport ship—near the Horn of
Africa.90 They were subsequently caught, detained, and charged with,
among other crimes, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1651—i.e., committing
piracy under “the law of nations.”91 The defendants moved to dismiss
the piracy charge, contending, in relevant part, that: (1) under the law
of nations, piracy required a showing of robbery or forcible
depredation; and (2) there was no dispute that the indictment failed to
allege facts sufficient to find that the defendants had committed
either.92 The District Court granted the motion. In so doing, it adopted
the definition of piracy set forth by the Supreme Court in a series of
piracy decisions rendered in the 1820s, near in time to the original
enactment of § 1651.93 These cases, according to the Said Court,
established that, under “the law of nations,” piracy was “robbery or
forcible depredations on the high seas, i.e., sea robbery.”94

88

89

90

91
92
93

94

contrary to the provisions of any treaty existing between the United States and
the state of which the offender is a citizen or subject, when by such treaty such
acts are declared to be piracy, is a pirate...”).
18 U.S.C. § 1655 (1948) (“Whoever, being a seaman, lays violent hands upon
his commander, to hinder and prevent his fighting in defense of his vessel or the
goods intrusted to him, is a pirate...”).
18 U.S.C. § 1661 (1948) (“Whoever, being engaged in any piratical cruise or
enterprise, or being of the crew of any piratical vessel, lands from such vessel
and commits robbery on shore, is a pirate...”).
United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 556-57 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated,
680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558-59.
Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 559-61 (citing, among other authorities, United States
v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 5 Wheat. 153 (1820)).
Id. at 562, 566-67.
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A few months later, on nearly identical facts, the District Court in
United States v. Hasan reached a different conclusion.95 In Hasan, the
defendants attacked the USS Nicholas—a Navy frigate—with rifles
and rocket-propelled grenades from a small boat off the coast of
Somalia.96 The defendants were chased, caught, and charged with
committing piracy under the law of nations pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1651.97 As in Said, there was no dispute that the indictment failed to
allege facts sufficient to establish that the defendants had committed
robbery or forcible depredation. Contending that piracy required a
showing of such acts, the defendants moved to dismiss the piracy
count against them.98 The District Court denied the motion. The court
concluded that piracy, under the law of nations, was “a changing body
of law,” and that, therefore, regardless of how piracy had been defined
in the past, the applicable definition was the one encompassed by
customary international law at the time when the alleged acts were
committed.99 Applying this rule, the court determined that, at the time
the defendants attacked the USS Nicholas, the international consensus
as to the definition of piracy was accurately reflected in Article 15 of
the 1958 High Seas Convention and Article 101 of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea (which the court viewed as being
essentially the same).100 Based on this definition, the court found that
the indictment sufficiently alleged acts of piracy because it
allege[d] that, while on the high seas, [the defendants] boarded an
assault boat, cruised towards the USS Nicholas, and opened fire
upon the Navy frigate with AK-47s. No lawful right to take such
actions having been alleged in the indictment, such facts constitute
an (1) illegal acts of violence, (2) committed for private ends, (3)
on the high seas, (4) by the crew of a private ship, 5) and directed
101
against another ship, or against persons on board such ship....

95
96
97
98
99
100
101

United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010).
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 629-30, 633.
Id. at 640-41.
Id. at 641.
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At trial, the jury convicted the defendants of, among other crimes,
committing piracy.102
In United States v. Dire—the direct appeal from Hasan—the
Fourth Circuit addressed the conflicting conclusions of the District
Courts in Said and Hasan.103 After evaluating the approaches taken by
the courts in each case, the Circuit Court adopted the views set forth in
Hasan, namely: (1) that piracy was an evolving doctrine, to be defined
in accordance with customary international law at the time of the
alleged offense; (2) that, at the time of the acts in question, customary
international law was accurately reflected in the 1958 High Seas and
1982 Conventions; and (3) that the more restrictive definition of piracy
set forth by the defendants, and adopted by the Said Court, i.e., that
piracy required a showing of robbery or forcible depredation, would
“render [§ 1651] incongruous with the modern law of nations.”104
Accordingly, the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court’s decision
in Hasan, and vacated the court’s decision in Said and remanded that
case for further proceedings.105
Despite their differing conclusions, both the Said and Hasan/Dire
Courts recognized that piracy must be understood in light of its
“modern origins and historical development.”106 Hasan and Dire
recognized that piracy under the law of nations is a changing body of
law that must be defined at the time of the alleged transgression.107
While such rules are, perhaps, effective mechanisms to effectuate
modern piracy prosecutions, applying the aforementioned standards to
those who once owned, controlled, or operated UCH is replete with
difficulties. Pirates have sailed the world’s oceans and seas since
ancient times, and have wrecked their vessels for as long a period.
Laws defining and governing piracy have changed with the passage of
time and the rise and fall of nations and governments.108 Is it possible,
in light of this lengthy and complicated history, to retroactively define

102
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104
105
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107
108

United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 450-52. (Dire, a co-defendant of Hasan, was named first on appeal because
he was the first to file an appeal).
Id. at 468-69.
Dire, 680 F.3d at 477; United States v. Said, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603 (E.D. Va. 2010).
Id. at 629-30, 633.
See TALTY, supra note 10, at 36; WOODARD, supra note 1, at 2.
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piracy at the time of the alleged transgression for purposes of
classifying UCH? We turn to this question.
IV. DEFINING PIRACY: THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
The Hasan Court began its historical analysis in 1787 with the
ratification of the United States Constitution.109 Because many, and
some of the most famous, alleged pirate-flagged UCH pre-date this
period, including the Whydah, this article will, instead, start with and
focus on the Anglo-American laws of piracy in effect during the height
of the British Colonial Period (circa. late 1500s to early 1800s).
Indeed, all of the ships mentioned in the introduction to this paper sank
during this time period:110 Drake’s ships Elizabeth and Delight
wrecked in 1596;111 Henry Morgan’s Satisfaction sank in 1671;112
Captain Kidd’s Adventure Galley and Rouparelle were lost in 1698;113
the Quedagh Merchant sank in 1699;114 Sam Bellamy’s ship, the
Whydah, wrecked in 1717;115 Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge
was lost in 1718;116 Charles Vane’s sloop sank in 1719;117 the La
Marquise de Tourny disappeared in the 1750s;118 and the Port-auPrince sank in 1806.119 By tracing the development of piracy laws
during this time period, as set forth primarily in statutes and the
common law, this article will demonstrate the difficulty inherent in
applying the Hasan/Dire test to UCH—i.e., retroactively defining
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Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 603-04.
See also ARTHUR HERMAN, TO RULE THE WAVES: HOW THE BRITISH NAVY
SHAPED THE MODERN WORLD 136-56 (2004) (the rise of piracy in the Americas
coincided with British attempts to control the sea).
RONALD, supra note 11, at 255.
TALTY, supra note 10, at 219.
WILLIAM H. BONNER, PIRATE LAUREATE: THE LIFE AND LEGENDS OF CAPTAIN
KIDD 12 (1947).
BONNER, supra note 113, at 14; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 203-22.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 156-58.
Lawrence & Wilde-Ramsing, supra note 6, at 3; KONSTAM, supra note 6, at
144-45.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 308.
THE HERALD, supra note 13.
THE TELEGRAPH, supra note 12.
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“piracy” for purposes of classifying UCH in accordance with the
term’s definition at the time of the alleged transgression.120
Our examination will show that, as the Said Court suggested,
piracy, at its core, is, and almost always has been, robbery at sea.121 In
other words, throughout the evolution of the piracy doctrine, AngloAmerican courts have consistently held that the commission of a
robbery at sea is a piratical act.122 But, as the Hasan/Dire Courts
noted, piracy is, and has historically been, defined to be more than just
robbery at sea. Indeed, as set forth in numerous statutes and judicial
records, piracy has often been defined to include such things as
committing, or attempting to commit, mutiny, committing
unauthorized or unjustified acts of violence or hostility at sea, an
unauthorized taking and carrying away (i.e., stealing) at sea,
voluntarily turning a ship’s goods over to pirates, impeding a ship’s

120
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See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 629-30, 633.
Compare Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 562, 566-67 (defining piracy under the law of
nations as “robbery or forcible depredations on the high seas, i.e., sea robbery”)
with Smith, 18 U.S. at 161 (stating that “whatever may be the diversity of
definitions, in other respects, all writers concur, in holding, that robbery, or
forcible depredations upon the sea, animo furandi, is piracy”); Dawson, infra
note 147, at 6 (defining piracy as “a sea-term for robbery, piracy being a robbery
committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty”). See also OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (1909) (a pirate is “one who robs and plunders on the sea,
navigable rivers, etc., or cruises about for that purpose); BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: BOOK IV 71 (1766) (“the offence of
piracy, by common law, consists in committing those acts of robbery and
depredation upon the high seas which, if committed upon land, would have
amounted to felony there”); SIR EDWARD EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 796
(1803) (same as Blackstone); SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 305
(1737) (“it is out of the question that piracy by the statue is robbery”); WILLIAM
HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 267 (1737) (“a pirate is one who, to enrich
himself, either by surprise or open force, sets upon merchants or others trading
by sea, to spoil them of their goods or treasure”); Alfred Rubin, The Law of
Piracy, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, Vol. 63, 1-3 (1988) (Grotius defined
pirates as “armed bands or individuals whose primary object was to plunder
regardless of place” (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (Ralph Deman
Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 1916)(1609)). Many early piracy laws
were derived from the views of legal commentators who, as seen above, often
agreed that piracy involved some type of armed and illicit taking but otherwise
disagreed as to the requisite elements of the crime. See Rubin, supra note 121, at
87.
See Rubin supra note 121, at 87.
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defenses in certain ways, or even sending certain types of threatening
messages at sea, among other formulations.123 These peripheral acts of
piracy have waxed and waned, creating inconsistencies in the legal and
historical record that confuse courts to this day, as exemplified by
Said.124
Making matters even more complicated is that, throughout most of
the pertinent time period, privateering—i.e., the taking and carrying
away of goods of another at sea pursuant to letters of marque or
commissions issued by an authorized governmental entity—was legal,
lucrative, and widespread.125 Privateering was often viewed as an
effective weapon capable of stifling the international trades and
economies of wartime enemies and/or economic competitors, and was
employed frequently to wreak havoc on the merchant marines of
foreign nations.126 Many of those now considered to be pirates sailed
with such commissions, including Henry Morgan,127 William Kidd,128
and Thomas Green,129 among others. Although the legal consequences
for committing acts of piracy were drastically different than those for
committing acts of privateering, in practice, one closely resembled the
other, and courts often struggled to differentiate which had occurred
on a given set of facts.130
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125

126

127
128
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130

See, e.g., An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 28 Hen. VIII c.
15 §§ VII-VIII (1698) (Eng.); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 et seq.
See, e.g., Dire, 680 F.3d at 468-69.
See CHARLES RAPPLEYE, ROBERT MORRIS: FINANCIER OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 12 (2010); TALTY supra note 10, at 35-36; WOODARD supra note
1, at 2-3; see, e.g., L’Invincible—The Consul of France, and Hill & M’Cobb, 14
U.S. 238 (1816); Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S. 281, 6 Cranch 281 (1810); Rose
v. Himley, 8 U.S. 241 (1807); Ketland v. The Cassius, 2 U.S. 365 (1796);
United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. 121 (1795); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133 (1795).
TALTY, supra note 10, at 35-36; RAPPLEYE, supra note 125, at 12; WOODARD,
supra note 1, at 2-3.
TALTY, supra note 10, at 194.
JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 441; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 100-8, 116-17.
Green Trial, infra note 210, at 27.
The distinction between privateer and pirate is incredibly important, and modern
sources too often blur the two classifications together. See, e.g., TALTY, supra
note 10, at 32-51 (using the terms “pirate” and “privateer” interchangeably);
JACQUES-YVES COUSTEAU, DIVING FOR SUNKEN TREASURE (1971) (describing
privateers as “official pirates”); RAPPLEYE, supra note 125, at 12 (describing
privateers as “freelance pirates”). The adoption of such imprecise definitions

2014

Regulating Jolly Roger

121

Another complexity was the legal system’s varying treatment for
different classifications of people on board a pirate vessel. For
example, both slaves and indentured servants commonly served on
pirate ships—some by choice, some by coercion.131 These persons,
even if they partook in piratical activities alongside the captain and
crew, were often treated differently than all others if captured and tried
on charges of piracy.132 Indeed, many courts deemed slaves and
servants to lack the requisite mens rea to be convicted of piracy if, in
engaging in piratical activities, they acted at the instruction of their
masters, and, more often than not, courts instructed the jury in
accordance with this view.133 Such perceptions often resulted in slaves
and servants being acquitted at trial, or in some cases, not standing
trial in the first place.134 In contrast, whether a captive—i.e., a person
held on board against their will135—or a member of the crew was
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133

134
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would result in several important public figures in American history, Thomas
Paine as one example, being adjudged pirates for their service aboard privateers.
See CRAIG NELSON, THOMAS PAINE 20-22 (2006). The confusion lies most likely
in the historical reality that many individuals signed up to serve aboard both
privateer and pirate ships at various times in their lives, or engaged in both
legitimate privateering and piracy while serving on the same vessel, switching
between the two depending on the current political tides and the availability of
economic opportunity. Confusion may also exist due to the fact that
governments against which privateers legally operated often referred to them
incorrectly as pirates, refusing to acknowledge the authority under which they
acted or otherwise ignoring it for purposes of vessel condemnation or
enforcement of trade or other laws. See WOODARD, supra note 1, at 51; RUBIN,
supra note 121, at 67.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 3, 193.
See, e.g., Kidd Trial, infra note 171, at 334-35; Johnson, supra note 14, at 449
(servant boys acquitted of charges of piracy even though they participated in
piratical activities).
See, e.g., Kidd Trial, infra note 171, at 334-35; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 449
(servant boys acquitted of charges of piracy even though they participated in
piratical activities).
See, e.g., WOODARD, supra note 1, at 193 (black or native boy—his precise
ethnicity is unknown—who survived the Whydah wreck was captured and sold
into slavery rather than tried on charges of piracy with the rest of Bellamy’s
crew); ZACKS, supra note 7, at 374, 376 (noting that several young servants
were acquitted of various piracy charges in the Kidd trial).
Captives usually included doctors, carpenters, pilots, and other persons
possessing professional skills not commonly held by those who willfully joined
pirate crews. Though sometimes held in holding cells below deck, captives were
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guilty of piracy generally depended on whether that person
participated in the piratical acts and, perhaps more importantly,
whether they shared in the plunder following a successful capture.136
Unlike slaves or servants, neither captives, nor the crew, escaped the
gallows in circumstances where evidence of both, or even one, of these
factors was elicited at trial.137 Completing the cast was the captain, the
least sympathetic of those aboard the vessel when it came to
allegations of piracy.138 Indeed, absent strong evidence of mutiny, the
captain was generally held responsible for the piratical actions of his
crew.139
Below, are several examples—from both the statutory and case
law—which highlight these observations and provide empirical cases
showing the levels of consistency (or, in many cases, inconsistency)
between the laws governing piracy during this time period, as well as
some of the uncertainty and ambiguity in the legal record left to us by
lawmakers and courts of ages past.
A. From Civil to Common Law Offense
1. Evolution of the Statutory Scheme
In its earliest form, piracy was a civil law offense.140 In Great
Britain, the High Court of Admiralty was established in the 1340s as a
prize court to preside over disputes involving piratical and other
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140

often given free range of the ship on threat of death should they try to escape.
See WOODARD, supra note 1, at 145; see, e.g., id. at 203-04 (recounting story of
a captive surgeon); id. at 181 (recounting story of a captive pilot held to steer
vessel through unfamiliar waters); Davis Trial, infra note 276, at 22 (acquittal of
a carpenter forced by Bellamy to serve aboard the Whydah); Bonnet Trial, infra
note 236, at 18-20, 40-41 (instructing the jury as to the law applicable to
“captives” found aboard pirate vessels).
See, e.g., Bonnet Trial, infra note 236, at 15, 17, 24, 31.
Id.
See, e.g., Kidd Trial, infra note 171; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 355-380
(recounting the Kidd trial with historical detail).
See DAVID CORDINGLY, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE
REALITY OF LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES 227 (1996).
Peter T. Leeson, Rationality, Pirates and the Law: A Retrospective, 59 AM. U. L.
REV. 1219, 1220 (2010); Lucas Beuto, Toward an International Law of Piracy
Sui Generis: How the Dual Nature of Maritime Piracy Law Enables Piracy to
Flourish, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 399, 403 (2011).
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captures at sea.141 Under this system, an act constituted piracy if the
alleged pirate confessed to committing piratical acts or if the
complaining party produced two witnesses able to testify about the
alleged piratical acts.142 Both of these requirements were difficult to
satisfy, and, as a result, few were convicted of committing piracy prior
to the 1530s.143
This status quo changed dramatically in 1535 with Parliament’s
passage of “An Act concerning Pirates and Robbers of the Sea,” as
supplemented and modified in 1536 by “An Act for Punishment of
Pirates and Robbers of the Sea.”144 Under these Acts, alleged pirates—
along with those charged with committing treasons, felonies,
robberies, murders, and confederacies on the sea—could be tried under
the common law, before a jury, making it easier (in theory, at least) to
convict and punish perpetrators.145 The 1536 Act did not, however,
define what constituted piracy, opting, instead, to leave such
definitions to the operation of the common law.146
2. The Trial of Captain Henry Avery’s Crew in London, 1696
The most prominent piracy trial to proceed during this period was
Rex v. Joseph Dawson, which commenced in London in October
1696.147 The operative facts originated three years earlier, when Henry
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High Court of Admiralty, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (last visited Oct. 21, 2014),
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/research-guides/high-courtadmiralty.htm.
Leeson, supra note 140, at 1219; Procedure for the Trial of a Pirate, 1 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 251, 253 (1957).
In re Piracy Jure Gentium, 1934 A.C. 586, 588-90 (1934) (Eng.).
National Archives, supra note 141; see Leeson, supra note 140, at 1219; see
also Offences at Sea Act, 1536 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, sec. 1(1) (Eng.) (observing that
the new statutes were necessary because, under the old scheme, “traytors,
pirates, thieves, robbers, murtherers and consederates upon the sea, many times
escaped unpunished, because the trial of their offences hath heretofore been
ordered, judged and determined before the admiral, or his lieutenant or
commissary, after the course of the civil laws”).
Leeson, supra note 140, at 1219; National Archives, supra note 141.
See 1536 28 Hen 8 c 15, sec. 1(4) (Eng.); [1934] A.C. 586, 590; see also Rubin,
supra note 121, at 77 (there existed much confusion and many conflicting views
as to what constituted piracy under the 1536 act).
Or: THE TRYALS OF JOSEPH DAWSON, EDWARD FORSEITH, WILLIAM MAY,
WILLIAM BISHOP, JAMES LEWIS, AND JOHN SPARKES FOR PIRACIES AND
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Avery (or Every) and several dozen crew, including Dawson, were
hired to serve as mariners aboard a privateer christened the Charles
II.148 However, instead of setting sail, the vessel remained at anchor
due to the failure of the Spanish crown to deliver the letters of marque
it had previously promised.149 Sometime thereafter, the crew—restless
in their idleness and unhappy with their lack of pay—mutinied and
Avery took command of the vessel and began capturing prizes.150 The
Gunsway (or Ganjisawai), a treasure ship of the Mughal Empire filled
with riches destined for Mecca, was one such prize.151
Several months after taking the Gunsway, six of Avery’s crew (but
not Avery himself) were caught and indicted for “feloniously and
piratically taking, and carrying away, from persons unknown, a certain
ship called the Gunsway with her tackle, apparel and furniture ... and
of goods ... together with 100000 pieces of eight, and 100000
chequins, upon the high seas....”152 Dawson pleaded guilty, but the
remaining five defendants proceeded to trial, where the jury rewarded
them with an acquittal.153
Undeterred, the government brought new piracy charges against
the defendants for their alleged involvement in the mutiny on board
the Charles II.154 The new indictment alleged that the defendants
did ... by Force of Arms upon the High and Open Seas ...
Piratically and Felloniously set upon one Charles Gibson, a subject
of our Sovereign Lord the King ... being then and there
Commander of a certain Merchant-ship, called, The Charles the

148

149
150
151

152
153
154

ROBBERIES BY THEM COMMITTED (London, 1696) [hereinafter the “Dawson
Trial”].
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 10-27; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 50-52. The
Charles II sported 46 guns and about 100 crew. WOODARD, supra note 1, at 22.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 10-27; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 50-52.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 10-27; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 50-52.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 20-23; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 53. The
Gunsway was a massive ship, featuring 80 guns and 800 crew and passengers.
Due to the size, military capacities, and sheer number on board the Gunsway,
Avery’s taking of it came at a violent cost, with the crews of both ships
exchanging cannon and musket fire before Avery’s men boarded the opposing
vessel and continued the violence hand-to-hand. WOODARD, supra note 1, at 2223.
Dawson Trial, supra note 147, at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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Second, .... And then and there put the said Charles Gibson in
bodily fear of his life. And then and there ... Feloniously and
Pyratically did steal take and carry away from the said Charles
Gibson, the said Ship called The Charles the Second, her Tackle,
Apparel and Furniture ... Forty Peices of Ordnance...; One
Hundred Fusees...; Fifteen Tun of Bread...; and two Hundred pair
of Woollen Stockings...; the Ship, Goods, and Chattels, of the
155
Subjects of our said Sovereign Lord the King....

This time, the jury found the defendants guilty of committing
piracy. In so finding, the jury applied the following instruction
provided by the Chief Judge of the Admiralty Court:
Piracy is only a Sea-term for Robbery, Piracy being a Robbery
committed within the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty. If any man be
assaulted within that Jurisdiction, and his Ship or Goods violently
taken away without Legal Authority, this is Robbery and Piracy. If
the Mariners of any Ship shall violently dispossess the Master, and
afterwards carry away the Ship it self, or any of the Goods, or
Tackle, Apparel, or Furniture, with a felonious Intention, in any
place where the Lord Admiral hath, or pretends to have
156
Jurisdiction; this is also Robbery and Piracy.

These instructions, viewed in light of the indictments, suggest that
piracy under the early common law had two core components: 1) a
taking and carrying away of items of value by violent means, i.e.,
robbery, 2) on the seas.157 Thus, a piracy was necessarily a robbery,
but the converse was not always true.158 Under the language employed
in Dawson, piracy included instances where vessels and their contents
were violently and illicitly captured as prizes or obtained via mutiny,
but did not necessarily include failed attempts at committing piratical
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158

Id. at 10.
Id. at 6.
Id.
See id.
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acts (i.e., failing to take and carry away items of value), 159 nor
instances of mere illicit or unauthorized violence at sea.160
B. A Statutory Supplement to the Common Law
While an improvement from the civil law system, the 1536 Act
ultimately failed to stifle the rise of piracy. To remedy certain
deficiencies in the Act, Parliament, in 1698, passed “An Act for the
More Effectuall Suppressions of Piracy,” which, like its predecessors,
applied to those charged with committing treasons, felonies, robberies,
murders, and confederacies on the sea.161 The 1698 Act was the first to
effectively adopt a dual approach to defining piracy. On one hand, it
left the crime of piracy as defined by the common law intact. On the
other, it codified parts of the common law and, in addition, identified
specific acts as constituting piracies, felonies, and robberies. For
example, Section VII of the 1698 Act provided:
That if any of His Majesties naturall borne subjects or denizens of
this kingdome shall commit any piracy or robbery or any act of
hostility against other His Majesties subjects upon the sea under
colour of any commission from any forreigne prince or state or
pretence of authority from any person whatsoever such offender
and offenders and every of them shall be deemed and adjudged and
162
taken to be pirates felons and robbers. . ..

Another example is found in Section VIII, which stated:
That if any commander or master of any shipp or any seaman or
marriner shall in any place where the Admirall hath jurisdiction
betray his trust and turne pirate enemy or rebell and piratically and
feloniously run away with his or their shipp or shipps or an barge

159

160

161
162

“Attempt” was not officially recognized as a crime until 1784. See Rex v.
Scofield, Cald. 397 (1784). However, by at least the late 1710s, commentators
had proposed, and prosecutors often argued, that attempts to commit particular
crimes, including piracy, should be considered as though the crime had actually
occurred. See, e.g., Mary Anne Trial, infra note 276, at 8.
Dawson Trial, supra note 147, at 6. Although not necessarily apparent on the
face of the jury instructions given in the Dawson Trial, the court’s legal
reasoning was later interpreted, not as setting forth an “exhaustive definition of
piracy,” but, rather, merely as the definition applicable to the facts at issue in
that case. 1934 A.C. at 588-90; see, e.g., Offences at Sea Act, 28 Hen. VIII. c.
15, § VII (1698).
Offences at Sea Act, 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15 (1698) (Eng.).
Id. at § VII.
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boate ordnance ammunition goods merchandizes or yield them up
voluntarily to any pirate or shall bring any seducing messages from
any pirate enemy or rebell or consult combine or confederate with
or attempt or endeavor to corrupt any commander master officer or
marriner to yield up or run away with any shipp goods or
merchandizes or turne pirate or goe over to pirates or if any person
shall lay violent hands on his commander whereby to hinder him
from fighting in defence of his shipp and goods committed to his
trust or that shall confine his master or make or endeavor to make a
revolt in the shipp shall be adjudged deemed and taken to be a
163
pirate felon and robber....

For the most part, the Act’s provisions were consistent with the
definition of piracy traditionally found at common law. For example,
piracy under the Act, as at common law, included instances of robbery
and mutiny at sea. But, in certain circumstances, the Act’s definition of
piracy was more expansive than previous articulations. For example,
under the Act, pirates also included those who: (1) committed certain
unjustified acts of hostility, or acts of hostility under false pretenses,
even if such acts did not amount to robbery; (2) voluntarily turned over
goods to those committing piratical acts; (3) impeded the defense of a
ship in certain ways; (4) delivered certain types of seducing or
threatening messages; (5) confederated or consulted with those
committing piratical acts; and (6) solicited others to turn pirate; among
other actions.164
C. Post-1698 Pirate Trials
1. The Trial of Captain William Kidd and his Crew in London,
1701
Captain William Kidd was among the first to be tried under the
scheme established by the 1698 Act. Kidd was a Scotland native but
came to reside in New York, where he made a name for himself as an
able seaman and capable privateer.165 In 1695, King William III
commissioned Kidd “with full power and authority to apprehend,
seize, and take into custody ... as all such pirates, free-booters, and searovers ... which you shall meet ... with all their ships and vessels, and
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Id. at § VIII.
See id. at §§ VII-X.
See BONNER, supra note 113, at 2; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 7-21, 59-77
(recounting the early life and privateering career of Captain Kidd).

128

UMass Law Review

v. 10 | 94

all such merchansizes, money, goods, & wares as shall be found on
board, or with them....”166 After recruiting crew for the expedition,
Kidd set off in the Adventure Galley, a privately commissioned galley
warship that had been financed primarily through the support of
several wealthy and prominent Englishmen.167 Over the next three
years, Kidd and his crew sailed from London to New York, to
Madagascar, to the Red Sea, to India, to the Caribbean, and to Boston,
capturing several prizes along the way.168 One of these prizes was an
Armenian ship named the Quedagh Merchant, which was captained by
an Englishman and filled with goods belonging to the East India
Company.169 Upon their arrival in Boston in 1699, Kidd and several of
his crew were arrested on charges of piracy and shipped to London to
await trial.170
In 1701, Kidd and his crew were indicted on, among other crimes,
five counts of “Pyracy and Robbery.”171 The indictment for the first
piracy count provided
that the prisoners ... upon the High Seas ... did pyrattically and
feloniously set upon, board, break, and enter a certain ship called
the Quedagh Merchant and pyrattically and feloniously assault the
mariners of the said ship, and put them in corporeal fear of their
lives, and did pyrattically and feloniously steal, take, and carry
away the said ship, with the apparrel and tackle thereof..., seventy
172
chests of opium....

Nowhere in the charges or the indictment did the government
specify whether Kidd and his crew were charged with piracy as
defined at common law, or pursuant to the 1698 Act, or both, but it is
sufficiently clear from the indictment that the charges were predicated
on a belief that Kidd and his crew had, without proper authority, taken
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See GRAHAM HARRIS, TREASURE AND INTRIGUE: THE LEGACY OF CAPTAIN KIDD
103-04 ( 2002); JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 441; BONNER, supra note 113, at 79; see also ZACKS, supra note 7, at 95-159 (recounting the history of Kidd’s
expedition).
BONNER, supra note 113, at 5-6; HARRIS, supra note 166, at 326-39.
ZACKS, supra note 7, at 95-159, 181-251.
BONNER, supra note 113, at 11; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 153-59.
ZACKS, supra note 7, at 250-86, 311-30.
THE TRYAL OF CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIDD FOR MURDER AND PIRACY, UPON SIX
SEVERAL INDICTMENTS 323 (London, 1701) [hereinafter the “Kidd Trial”].
Id. at 322.
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and carried away both the Quedagh Merchant and its goods by violent
means while at sea—i.e., had committed sea robbery.173
At trial, the Adventure Galley’s surgeon, Robert Braddinham, was
the key witness against the defendants.174 In large part, Braddinham
testified in accordance with the acts as alleged in the indictment,
stating that
[s]ome time in January, Capt. Kidd put up French colours, and
gave chase to the Quedah Merchant, and when he came up with
her he commanded the master on board, and there came first an old
French man, who was the gunner: then Kidd sent for the captain,
who was one Wright, an English man, and when he was brought on
board, Kidd told him he was his prisoner, and ordered his men to
go aboard and take possession of the ship; and he dispos’d of the
175
goods on that coast....

In contrast to the allegations in the indictment—that Kidd and his
crew assaulted the crew of the Quedagh Merchant and put them in
corporal fear of their lives, i.e., took the ship by violent means—
Braddinham’s and the other witnesses’ testimony did not focus on the
method of taking or whether any violence had been involved, but
instead on whether the Quedagh Merchant had been sailing under
French passes.176
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Id.
Id. at 326-28.
Id.at 326.
See ROBERT RITCHIE, CAPTAIN KIDD AND THE WAR AGAINST THE PIRATES 10809 (1989) (suggesting that the Quedagh Merchant was taken without actual
violence); CORDINGLY, supra note 139, at 184 (same); JOHNSON, supra note 14,
at 445-47 (same). To be sure, there is evidence in the historical record
suggesting that, though actual violence may not have been used by Kidd to
effectuate the taking, the threat of violence was, in fact, used. But, on the other
hand, there also exists some evidence that the Quedagh Merchant, its captain
relying on inaccurate rumors that Kidd was a vicious pirate, surrendered upon
sight of Kidd’s vessel in order to avoid what he perceived to be a looming
violent confrontation rather than first determining whether Kidd did, in fact,
harbor piratical intentions. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 445-47; see
also WOODARD, supra note 1, at 7, 206 (pirates most often used fear and terror
to capture prizes, rather than actual violence). Greater evidence as to the
violence issue should have been presented at trial, and the issue should have
thereafter been given to the jury for a determination, with accompanying jury
instructions.
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In similar fashion, the Court glossed over the violence requirement
in its instructions to the jury. The Chief Judge of the Admiralty Court
instructed:
That to make the Fact Piracy, there must be a piratical and
felonious taking upon the High Sea ... the Goods of a Friend; viz.
Such as are in Amity with the King. That if this Quedah Merchant
had belong’d to the French or the Ship had been sailed under
French Passes, then it was lawful Prize, and liable to Confiscation.
But if they were the Goods of Persons in Amity with the King, and
the Ship was not Navigated under French Passes, then it was very
177
plain, it was a Piratical Taking. . ..

While in large part consistent with the instructions given in
Dawson,178 these instructions failed to expressly require the jury to
find that Kidd and his crew had “violently taken away” the Quedagh
Merchant and its goods.179 Instead, the instructions allowed the jury to
ultimately find Kidd and his crew guilty of piracy by concluding that
they: 1) acted outside the scope of their commission; 2) by taking and
carrying away items of value; 3) from a vessel in amity with England;
4) while at sea—no violence required.180 This oversight is surprising
because predecessor cases like Dawson clearly articulated that
violence was a required element of piracy;181 and, moreover, because,
under the common law, violence was an element of robbery, and
piracy was robbery at sea.
The most likely explanation for this omission is that the Court
simply assumed that Kidd’s taking had been by violent means. Indeed,
by the time Kidd stood trial, he had already been publicly adjudged a
pirate by local periodicals182 and had been called before the British
Parliament to explain his piratical actions—which, for the most part,
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Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 334-35.
See Dawson Trial, supra note 147, at 6.
Compare Dawson Trial, supra note 147, at 6 with Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at
336-44 (applying these instructions, Kidd and his crew were convicted of a total
of five counts of piracy, only some of which the evidence indicated involved
acts of violence.). See also RITCHIE, supra note 176, at 108-09; ZACKS, supra
note 7, at 368-77.
See Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 335.
See Dawson Trial, supra note 147, at 6.
See ZACKS, supra note 7, at 347-49.
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he failed to do to the satisfaction of its members.183 Further, Kidd was
tried, first, on a count for allegedly murdering one of the members of
his crew, to which a verdict of “guilty” was announced in the middle
of his separate trial on the first piracy count, within earshot of the
judges and the jury.184 Thus, by the time the court instructed the jury
as to the crime of piracy, it had likely been established, at least in the
eyes of those involved in the trial, that Kidd was a violent person.185
With this assumption in hand, the Court’s instructions (as well as the
witnesses’ testimony) focused, not on whether Kidd’s violent
tendencies permeated his activities at sea, but instead on rebutting the
primary argument made at trial in Kidd’s defense—that the Quedagh
Merchant was a French ship, i.e., that it sailed under French passes—
and that, therefore, he was authorized by his commission to take the
ship as a prize.186 Kidd asserted that Lord Bellomont—the thencolonial governor of Massachusetts, New York, and New Hampshire,
and one of the original backers of Kidd’s expedition—had taken the
Quedagh Merchant’s passes from Kidd at the time of his arrest, and
that, therefore, he could not produce them in court in his defense.187
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ZACKS, supra note 7, at 347-49; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 448.
Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 315-21; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 355-80.
See Kidd Trial, supra note 171, 315-21; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 355-80.
Kidd Trial, supra note 171 at 325, 330-31, 334 (Kidd arguing, in his defense,
that “the Quedah Merchant was under a French Commission”). Kidd also
asserted on several occasions before and during trial that his crew had mutinied,
and that he had not ordered nor acquiesced in the piratical activities in which
they might have engaged. See, e.g., id. at 330, 334; ZACKS, supra note 7, at 373;
JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 445, 450-51. The judges gave this contention a swift
rebut, and, in similar fashion to the court’s omission of the violence
requirement, did not instruct the jury as to the laws applicable to an alleged
mutiny. The trial record suggests that one of the reasons the Admiralty judges
did not believe Kidd’s contention that he had a valid commission to take the
ships was because he failed to properly condemn the prize ships, as required by
law. When questioned about this failure, Kidd responded, “I was not at the
sharing of the Goods. I knew nothing of it” and “I could not, because of the
Mutiny in my Ship.” Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 330, 334. In contrast to the
mutiny issue, the jury was provided some instruction as to the law of prizes. Id.
at 334; see also RUBIN, supra note 121, at 99 (suggesting that Kidd was
convicted of piracy, in part, because he failed to properly condemn his prize
takings).
Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 331, 334; see also BONNER, supra note 113, at 1415.
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Kidd never raised the violence issue nor contended that his taking of
the Quedagh Merchant had been non-violent, and, as a result, the issue
was not addressed nor discussed at trial.
The trial devolved after Kidd had been convicted of murder and,
along with his crew, of committing piratical acts against the Quedagh
Merchant. Due most likely to the fact that their prior convictions
carried death sentences, Kidd and his crew stopped trying to defend
themselves with respect to the latter counts of piracy (some, in fact,
pled guilty).188 As a result, the prosecutor’s evidence against them
became increasingly sparse with each count and conviction.189 Far
from informing our analysis as to the requisite elements of the crime of
piracy at the time of the alleged transgressions, the trial record for
these counts remains unclear, at best, and inconsistent with the
indictment and the instructions given to the jury as to the first piracy
count, at worst.
One aspect of the trial, however, remained remarkably consistent
throughout—the treatment of the three servants on board the vessels
that sailed under Kidd’s command. When asked about the allegations
against them, the servants admitted to participating in piratical
activities, but responded that they had been required to do so by their
masters, who were among the members of the crew.190 In support of
their claims, the servants maintained that they had not shared in the
bounty seized during the various piratical endeavors.191 As to these
points, the court instructed the jury as follows:
“There must be Freedom of Will to denominate a Fact, either
Felony or Piracy; and if these Men did so under the Compulsion of
their Masters, and not voluntarily, it might distinguish their Case from
the rest.”192
Applying this standard, the jury acquitted all three servants of the
piracy counts against them.193
This treatment was in stark contrast with the court’s dealings with
Kidd’s crew. For example, several members of the crew argued that,
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Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 336-44.
Id.; see also ZACKS, supra note 7, at 376-77.
Kidd Trial, supra note 171, at 331-32.
Id.
Id. at 334-35.
Id. at 335, 343.
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although they had participated in the piratical activities alleged, they
had been forced to do so by Kidd or other crew members.194 Others
argued that they had acted under a mistaken but honest belief that
Kidd’s commission authorized their piratical takings.195 The Admiralty
judges were not persuaded, and, on this point, instructed the jury as
follows:
As to those who would excuse themselves, as being under Captain
Kidd’s Command; that would justify them in nothing, but the
obeying his lawful Commands. And it was not contested but that
these Men knew, and were sensible of what was done; and did take
part in it, and shar’d what was taken. And if the taking of this Ship,
and Goods, was unlawful, then these Men could claim no
Advantage from acting under Kidd’s Commissions: Because those
Commissions gave them no Authority to act what they did. They
196
acted quite contrary to them.

Using this standard, the jury convicted those members of Kidd’s
crew standing trial with him, and all were sentenced to hang at the
gallows (although some were later pardoned).197
2. The Trial of Captain John Quelch and his Crew in Boston,
1704
In 1703, John Quelch and more than two dozen others signed up to
sail with the Charles, a well-armed privateer commissioned by the
governor of Massachusetts to capture French and Spanish ships and
goods.198 Soon after setting sail from Marblehead, Massachusetts, the
ship’s captain, a man named Daniel Plowman, fell violently ill.199
Sensing opportunity, the crew locked Plowman in his quarters (where
he later died),200 mutinied, and elected Quelch as their new captain.
Quelch steered the vessel to the Brazilian coast, where they attacked
and took goods from nine Portuguese vessels before returning to
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Id. at 331-32.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 335, 343.
THE ARRAIGNMENT, TRIAL, AND CONDEMNATION OF CAPT. JOHN QUELCH AND
OTHERS OF HIS COMPANY 1-2 (London, 1705) [hereinafter “Quelch Trial”].
Id. at 8-11. There was conflicting testimony given as to when, exactly, the
captain died, and whether he was killed by the crew or died from illness.
Id.
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Marblehead. Once back in Massachusetts, a majority of the crew
dispersed and went on their way.201 Nine members of the crew,
including Quelch, elected to stay in Marblehead, where six of them
were eventually arrested and charged with multiple counts of piracy,
robbery, and murder.202 The other three crew members were captured
but turned the King’s Evidence and escaped the gallows.203
Trial commenced in Boston in June of 1704.204 As the first piracy
trial held outside the confines of the Old Bailey in London, the
defendants were not given the benefit of a jury.205 Instead, a bench of
Admiralty judges was tasked with assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence against the defendants, a case resting largely on
circumstantial testimony.206 The first indictment against Quelch and
his crew was representative of the other eight. That indictment charged
that Quelch and the others
by Force and Arms upon the High Sea ... Piratically and
Feloniously did Surprize, Seize, and Take a small Fishing Vessel,
(having Portuguise Men on Board) and belonging to the Subjects
of the King of Portugal, (Her Majesty’s good Allie) and out of her
then and there ... Feloniously and Piratically, did by Force and
207
Arms take and carry away a quantity of Fish and Salt....

The remaining indictments asserted that, in addition to fish and
salt, Quelch and his crew took and carried away, by force of arms,
items including salt, sugar, molasses, rum, rice, beef and other food
items, silk and linen cloth, ceramics, slaves, weaponry, and gold,
silver, and other currency, from various other Portuguese-flagged
vessels.208
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See Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, “An account of the behaviour and last
dying speeches of the six pirates, that were executed on Charles River, Boston
side on Fryday June 30th 1704 ....” first printed by Nicholas Boone, Boston,
Massachusetts, 1704, available at, http://www.history.org/History/teaching
/enewsletter/volume7/june09/primsource.cfm.
Id.
Id.
Quelch Trial, supra note 198, at 1-2.
Id. at 1-7.
Id. at 1-7.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2-4.
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Because the case was not tried before a jury, the record contains no
jury instructions from which the applicable definition of piracy can be
gleaned. However, the indictments, coupled with the prosecutor’s
arguments during trial, give the clear impression that Quelch and his
men were charged with, and eventually found guilty of, violently
taking and carry away the goods of a friend while at sea—i.e.,
committing sea robbery.209 However, due to the sparseness of the
surviving trial and historical record, we may never know precisely the
elements of which Quelch and his crew were found guilty.
3. The Trial of Captain Thomas Green and his Crew in
Scotland, 1705
Another infamous trial under the 1698 Act was that of Thomas
Green and his crew.210 The historical record of Green’s voyage is
scant. What is known is that, sometime in the 1690s or early 1700s,
Green set out from England with a commission from the English
crown “to act in hostility against all pirats.”211 At some point
thereafter, he and several members of his crew returned to the British
Isles and were subsequently arrested. In 1705, they were indicted in
Scotland for committing piracy, robbery, and murder on the following
allegations:
The said Captain Thomas Green and his Crew ... did without any
Lawful Warran[t], or just cause, atta[ck] the said other Vessel or
Ship, while expecting no such Treatment and invading her first by
their Sloup, which they laid manned with Gunns and other Arms
for that purpose, they fell upon the said other Vessel in a Hostile
manner, by shooting of Gunns and other ways, and after some time
spent in fighting against her by their Sloup, and partly by the
approach of the said Thomas Green Ship the Worcester, they
overcame, and Boarded the said other Vessel, and having seized
their Men, they killed them, and threw them over-board, and then
carried, or caused [to be] carr[ied] away the Goods that were
aboard the said other Vessel to their said Ship the Worcester, and

209

210

211

Id. at 6. At trial, the prosecutor emphasized: 1) the type of goods taken, 2) the
type of violence used by the crew in taking the ships and the goods, 3) that the
ships were Portuguese, 4) that the crew did not protest the piratical actions
undertaken, and 5) that they shared in the resulting plunder.
THE TRIAL OF CAPTAIN THOMAS GREEN AND HIS CREW 1 (London, 1705)
[hereinafter the “Green Trial”].
Id. at 27.
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then disposed upon the said Ship, by felling her ashore on the said
212
Coast.

At trial, several witnesses testified about the attack, including in
their testimony bloody descriptions of the violence committed against
the other vessel and her crew (including that the crew had been
chopped up with hatchets).213 In stark contrast to the evidence
presented at the Kidd trial, the grotesque violence allegedly committed
by Green and his crew was of primary importance in the case
presented by the prosecution.214 While the trial record fails to indicate
what, or if, the jury was instructed as to the crime of piracy, the
prosecutor’s arguments appear to be illustrative of the view of piracy
generally accepted by the Court. The prosecutor argued that the crime
committed by Green and his crew was “[t]o attack and invade a free
ship without any Cause or Warrant, and to kill her men and rob her
goods....”215 and that, “[i]t was certainly piracy, robbery, and murder to
attacque a ship, hostilely, and to destroy the men, and rob the
goods.”216 Although the prosecutor contended that the crime of piracy
was more “atrocious” than either robbery or murder, by themselves, he
never distinguished between the requisite elements of the three
crimes.217 Instead, the prosecutor argued that, “[t]he crime of piracy is
complex, and is made up of oppression, robbery, and murder
committed in places far remote and solitary... [in this case,] in the vast
ocean.”218
At the close of evidence, the jury convicted Green and his crew of
committing piracy.219 To the extent that the jury relied on the
prosecutor’s definition of piracy in so finding, the jury could have
applied the narrowest definition of piracy ever articulated—i.e., that
piracy consists, not only of robbery, which itself contains a violence
element, but also of oppression and murder committed in places
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Id. at 3.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 16-19; see also, generally, Kidd Trial supra note 171 (noting the lack of
violence at issue).
Green Trial, supra note 210, at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 56-57.
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remote and solitary.220 Or, more appropriately, the jury could have
interpreted the prosecutor’s explanation as simply a less-than-perfect
articulation of the prevalent view that piracy includes aspects of the
crimes of robbery, murder, and oppression, but does not require the
existence of all three at the same time, and is, moreover,
distinguishable from them in that piracy can only be committed on the
seas, rather than ashore.221 However, based on the surviving record,
the answer to this quandary remains unclear.
D. The Golden Age of Piracy
Notwithstanding the highly publicized Kidd trial and the crown’s
attempts to make it easier to prosecute pirates, the 1700s and 1710s
experienced a dramatic rise in incidents of piracy. This resulted from a
variety of political, social, and personal reasons, including: an increase
in European colonial conquests worldwide and a corresponding
expansion of trade across the world’s seas;222 a brief cessation of war
among the prominent powers of Europe, which, in effect, negated the
commissions of hundreds, if not thousands, of career privateers,
forcing them to either turn pirate or find a new profession;223 the
ability of small bands of private individuals to finance and/or
commandeer seagoing vessels capable of matching the best ships in
any country’s navy in size and firepower;224 an influx of slaves and
indentured servants to the Americas, who escaped from their masters
and joined pirate ranks to gain freedom;225 and the brutal and
oftentimes inhumane treatment of sailors aboard navy and merchant
marine vessels, which, along with poor pay, inspired many to abandon
their posts and join pirate crews.226
Many of the most infamous pirate captains sailed during this
period: Benjamin Hornigold, Blackbeard, Sam Bellamy, Charles Vane,
Mary Read, Calico Jack, Anne Bonny, Stede Bonnet, Bartholomew
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Id. at 48.
For a more articulate explanation of this view, see Mary Anne Trial, infra note
276, at 6.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 4.
See id. at 52-85.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3, 37-38.
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Roberts, and many others.227 These captains controlled fleets ranging
from one or two ships to more than twenty, commanded crews
numbering in the hundreds, and operated with little to no constraint
from bases located throughout the Bahamian archipelago and the
Carolinas, among other places.228 They were responsible for taking
hundreds, if not thousands, of prizes during the early 1700s, and
damaging and disrupting the international trades and colonial
economies of, among others, the English, Spanish, French, and Dutch.
Despite the vast number of pirates operating worldwide during the
Golden Age and the magnitude of the prizes they took during this
period, relatively few were captured and prosecuted in courts of law.229
Some, such as Bellamy and the majority of his crew, met their fate at
sea, perishing in storms and other natural calamities.230 Others, such as
Blackbeard, died in armed engagements with royal navies, privateers,
or while attempting to capture prizes.231 Some, such as Benjamin
Hornigold, were pardoned for their misdeeds without ever facing the
scrutiny of a court or a jury.232 Others perished in prison awaiting
trial.233 The remnant were neither prosecuted nor caught, and instead
lived out their days scattered throughout the colonial hemisphere in
places such as Virginia, the Carolinas, Madagascar, Jamaica, and the
Bahamas.234
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See generally JOHNSON, supra note 14 (portraying the lives of these and other
alleged pirate captains in exciting fashion). The first volume of Johnson’s book,
A General History of the Pyrates, was released in 1724 and was an immediate
bestseller. Johnson followed with a second volume in 1728, which was also
immensely popular.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 87-88; see, e.g., id., at 223 (noting that, at one time,
Blackbeard commanded approximately 700 men and a small fleet of vessels);
CORDINGLY, supra note 139, at 248-49 (detailing the size of several Golden Age
pirate crews).
CORDINGLY, supra note 139, at 227 (explaining that it was not until the early
1720s that pirates began to be widely hunted, captured, and tried in courts of
law).
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 182-85.
Id. at 291-96 (recounting Blackbeard’s demise).
Id. at 236.
CORDINGLY, supra note 139, at 247.
See, e.g., WOODARD, supra note 1, at 77, 97 (mutinous crew never prosecuted
for piracy).

2014

Regulating Jolly Roger

139

The records of many pirate trials that took place during this period
have been lost to the tests of time. For example, the transcript for the
trial of members of Blackbeard’s crew, who were tried, convicted, and
hanged in Williamsburg, Virginia, was most likely burned with the rest
of Richmond, Virginia, during the Civil War.235 Of the records that
survive, the most helpful, and indeed most well-known pirate trial, is
that of Major Stede Bonnet, who was tried on charges of committing
acts of piracy along with thirty-three members of his crew in the courts
of Charleston, South Carolina, in 1718.236
1. The Trial of Major Stede Bonnet and his Crew in
Charleston, 1718
Major Stede Bonnet had a brief but illustrious career as a pirate
captain during piracy’s golden age. He hailed from a wealthy,

235

The trial of Blackbeard’s crew took place in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1719.
Thirteen were found guilty of the piracies alleged, one was acquitted, and many
were hanged. WOODARD, supra note 1, at 297; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 8687. The indictment of Blackbeard’s quartermaster, William Howard, survives. It
provided:
That the said Will Howard . . . did Sometime in the year of our Lord
1717 Join and Associate himself with one Edward Tach (Teach—
Blackbeard), and other Wicked and disolute Persons, & with them did
Combine to fit out in Hostile manner, a Certain Sloop or Vessel called
the Revenge, to Committ Pyracys and depredations upon the High
Seas, on the Subjects of our Lord the King and of other Princes, &
States in Amity with his Majesty trading in America, &c.
And in pursuance of the said Felonious and Pyratical Combination the
said Will Howard did, together with his Associates and Confederates,
on or about the 29th day of Sept in the year Affordsaid, in an Hostile
manner with force and arms on the high seas, near Cape Charles in this
Colony . . . attack & seize a Sloop called the Betty of Virginia,
belonging to the Subjects of our said Lord the King, and the said Sloop
did then and their Rob and Plunder of Certain Types of Medera Wine,
and other goods and Merchandizes, and thereafter the said Will Howard
did Sink and destroy the said Sloop, &c &c—
W.M. P. PALMER, CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS
1652–1781, VOL. I, 196 (1875); see also LYON TYLER, TYLER’S QUARTERLY
HISTORICAL AND GENEALOGICAL MAGAZINE, Vol. I, 36-39 (1967).
236
THE TRYALS OF MAJOR STEDE BONNET AND OTHER PIRATES (London, 1718)
[hereinafter the “Bonnet Trial”]; see also WOODARD, supra note 1, at 300-01
(summarizing and describing the impacts of the Bonnet trial); JOHNSON, supra
note 14, at 104-06 (same).
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plantation-owning family from Barbados, and carried on the family
tradition until sometime in mid-1717 when, for reasons unknown (but
which may have been related to marital troubles or mental health
issues), he abandoned the plantation life and turned to the sea.237
Bonnet purchased a private sloop, renamed it the Revenge, outfitted it
for war (ten guns), recruited crew (eighty men), and then went pirating
throughout the Caribbean and the North Atlantic, taking many prizes
along the way.238 Several months after setting off from Barbados,
Bonnet joined forces with Blackbeard (or more likely, Blackbeard took
command of the Revenge and Bonnet’s crew, and, lacking options,
Bonnet ceded his ship and authority to Blackbeard), and together they
continued to take prizes throughout the remainder of 1717 and the
early months of 1718 (including the infamous blockade of Charleston
harbor).239 That spring the pirates lost the Queen Anne’s Revenge in
Topsail Inlet, off the coast of North Carolina, along with a second
vessel, thus severely weakening the force of their military
capabilities.240 This change of circumstance inspired most of the
pirates, including Blackbeard and Bonnet, to take the King’s Pardon
and cease their piratical activities.241
The oath, however, proved to be nothing more than a temporary
arrangement. Indeed, by the end of the summer, both Blackbeard and
Bonnet had outfitted sloops, recruited crews, and returned to piracy,
although, this time they remained as distinct outfits.242 In July or
August of 1718, Blackbeard marooned a dozen or more of his crew on
a sandbar island off the coast of North Carolina. Bonnet happened
upon them, picked them up, and the men sailed with Bonnet along the
North Atlantic coast, taking prizes and sharing in the booty.243 While
engaging in these activities, Bonnet at first acted under the false
pretenses that he had obtained a commission to take Spanish vessels
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See JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 95.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 197-225, 240-43 (describing Bonnet’s background,
setting forth the possible reasons for his decision to go pirating, and detailing his
preparations to embark on the Revenge for said purposes).
Id.; JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 95-96.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 255.
Id. at 256-58; JOHNSON, supra note 14 at 97.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 255-58.
Id. at 255-58.
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from the Dutch (he apparently intended to seek such a commission but
never, in fact, did so), though he eventually abandoned all efforts at
disguising his piratical takings behind legal formalities.244 His illicit
career continued until September 1718, when his fleet (which had, by
this point, grown to several vessels), while anchored in an inlet in the
Cape Fear River to conduct repairs, unexpectedly encountered a naval
contingent sent by the Governor of South Carolina. After a two-day
sea battle, Bonnet and thirty-three of the surviving members of his
crew surrendered.245
The crew was tried in Charleston in groups of five to nine on two
counts of piracy246 (although during trial the prosecutor and witnesses
often referenced many of the other takings not formally charged).247
Bonnet was tried separately, due in large part to his brief escape from
house arrest prior to the commencement of proceedings.248 After his
recapture, Bonnet, like his crew, was brought to trial before a jury, the
judges of the Admiralty presiding.249 The first indictment against
Bonnet and his men was illustrative of the second. It charged as
follows:
That Stede Bonnet ... [and the other defendants] by Force & upon
the High Sea . . . did piratically and feloniously set upon, break,
board, and enter a certain Merchant-Sloop, called the Francis,
Peter Manwareing Commander, ... and then and there piratically
and feloniously did make an Assault in and upon the
[Commander], and other [of] his Mariners.... In the same Sloop,
then and there being, piratically and feloniously, did put the
aforementioned [Commander], and others [of] his Mariners of the
same Sloop ... in Corporal Fear of their Lives ... upon the High Sea
... and . . . piratically and feloniously did steal, take, and carry
250
away said Merchant-Sloop, called the Francis [and its goods]....

244
245
246
247
248
249
250

JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 97-98.
Id. at 99-105.
Bonnet Trial, supra note 236, at 5, 10.
Id. at 3, 9, 16.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 37-41.
Id. at 7. The goods allegedly stolen included, among other items, rum, molasses,
sugar, cotton, indigo, weaponry, silver, sold, and jewelry. Id. The second count
of piracy brought against the defendants was a similar indictment for taking a
vessel called the Fortune, along with its contents. Id. at 21.
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The trial transcript does not reflect whether and, if so, how the jury
was instructed as to the definition of the crime of piracy; however, in
opening statement the prosecutor explained to the jury: “Now as to the
Nature of the Offense: Piracy is a Robbery committed upon the Sea,
and a Pirate is a Sea-Thief.”251 It appears from the record that the
admiralty judges fully accepted this definition and operated pursuant
to it throughout the trial.252 For example, at one point during the
proceedings, the Chief Judge of the Admiralty stated to the jury, “not
only did they [Bonnet’s crew] break and board the said Manwareing’s
Sloop, which was an Act of Piracy, but [. . .] they were at the taking of
thirteen Vessels after they left Topsail-Inlet.”253 Applying this
conception of piracy to the evidence against the defendants (which
included the testimony of members of Bonnet’s crew who had turned
the King’s Evidence), the jury convicted Bonnet and the majority of
his crew of the first piracy count charged.254 Thereafter, Bonnet and
several others pleaded guilty to, and the jury found all but four of the
remaining members of the crew guilty of, the second count of piracy
alleged against them.255
Bonnet, in his defense, contended that he had a commission to take
Spanish ships (he did not).256 The judges of the Admiralty Court were
not persuaded (Bonnet was understandably unable to procure any hard
evidence of his nonexistent commission), and, in any event, there was
no evidence procured at trial that the vessels Bonnet and his men were
charged with piratically taking were Spanish.257 Alternatively, Bonnet
contended that he had not given his consent to the taking of the
Francis, that “[i]t was contrary to [his] inclinations; and [he] told [the
crew] several times if they would not leave off that course of life, [he]
would leave the sloop” and that, when the ship was taken, “[he] was
251
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Id. at 3.
See id. at 24.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 24-27, 31-36.
Id. at 37-41.
Offences at Sea Act, 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15 § VII (Eng.). If the ships were British,
the alleged commission, likewise, would not have saved Bonnet from the
gallows. British citizens—such as Bonnet—who attacked British vessels while
acting under commissions issued by foreign States were still committing acts of
piracy.
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asleep.”258 The defense fell on deaf ears. At the end of trial, the Chief
Judge summarized the evidence against Bonnet as follows: that “Major
Bonnet was Commander in chief” of the Revenge, that the goods
aboard the Francis had been “sent off by Major Bonnet’s order; and
that his share was brought into the round-house to him,” and that, “[a]s
for his pretence, that his men forced him against his will, it appears by
the evidence he did not act like a person under constraint.”259 The jury,
siding with the Admiralty judges, convicted Bonnet of committing acts
of piracy against the Francis.260 Bonnet pled guilty to the remaining
count and was thereafter sentenced to death by hanging.
Most of the crew attempted to defend themselves by asserting one,
or a combination of, the following arguments: many contended that
they had joined Bonnet’s crew under the false, but honest belief that
Bonnet had a commission to take Spanish vessels;261 some maintained
that they had no choice but to join Bonnet’s crew because they had
been marooned on an island by Blackbeard and were in dire need of
food and water;262 others asserted that they were forced to engage in
piratical acts by threat of death or other injury from Bonnet and/or
members of the crew;263 and finally, a minority contended that they
had been held captive by Bonnet against their will, and they had
neither engaged in the piratical acts committed by the crew, nor shared
in the resulting plunder.264
To illustrate the effect of these defenses, a brief comparison of the
arguments presented by two alleged members of Bonnet’s crew is
helpful. Neal Paterson asserted a two-fold defense at trial. First, he
argued that he had been forced to join Bonnet’s crew because he had
been marooned on an island. Alternatively, he argued that he had acted
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Bonnet Trial, supra note 236, at 40.
Id. at 41; but see WOODARD, supra note 1, at 274-77 (observing that the
historical record contains some evidence indicating that Bonnet did not wish to
return to piracy after taking the King’s Pardon, but was forced to do so by his
crew at the threat of losing the Revenge).
Bonnet Trial, supra note 236, at 41.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 16 (Thomas Carman trying to defend himself).
See, e.g., id. at 14-15 (Neal Paterson attempting a defense).
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under the assumption that Bonnet had, or would soon obtain, a
commission to take Spanish ships.265 As Paterson stated:
Thatch [Blackbeard] came on board and carried away fourteen of
our best Hands, and marooned twenty-five of us on an Island; and
Maj. Bonnet came and told us he was minded to go to St.
Thomas’s, and if there were any Commissions from the Emperor,
to get one, and go a privateering against the Spaniards; so I was
willing to go with him, and when I was on board, he forced me to
266
do what he pleased, for it was against my will.

These defenses failed, however, for a variety reasons, including
that Paterson was unable to establish that Bonnet had a legitimate
commission, that the evidence against Paterson was that he appeared
to be an active and willing participant, if not an instrumental force in
the taking of the vessels identified in the indictment, and even more
damning, the undisputed fact that Paterson had shared in the plunder of
the vessels after they had been robbed.267 In light of this evidence, the
jury convicted Paterson of the charges of piracy alleged against him.268
Indeed, in similar fashion, all those who contended that they had
participated in the piratical enterprise due to force or threat of force, or
otherwise against their will, but had thereafter shared in the plunder,
were found guilty of committing acts of piracy.269
In contrast, Thomas Nichols successfully convinced the jury that
he was neither a felon nor a pirate.270 The evidence established that
Nichols had been captured and brought on board the Revenge by force
and against his will, that he had been held below deck in a holding
cell, that he did not partake in the piratical taking nor take up force of
arms against the merchant vessels identified in the indictment, and
most importantly, that he did not share in the plunder extracted from
those vessels as did the rest of the crew.271 This evidence, according to
the Admiralty judges, established that Nichols “seems to be under a
constraint indeed,” and that his unique circumstances “must be taken
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into consideration” by the jury in determining whether Nichols had
engaged in acts of piracy.272 The jury was persuaded and Nichols was
acquitted of the charges against him, along with several other captives
similarly situated.273
2. The Trials of Eight of Bellamy’s Crew in Boston, 1718
The analysis returns, finally, to Bellamy and his crew. Only two
members of Bellamy’s crew survived the wreck of the Whydah.274
However, at the time of his demise, Bellamy was commodore of three
vessels, two of which survived the storm. One of these vessels
returned to the Caribbean unscathed. The remaining vessel, the Mary
Anne, was damaged and ran aground in the storm, forcing the crew to
take to shore.275 Seven members of the crew were subsequently
captured by local authorities, and indicted and tried in Boston on
charges of piracy.276 Similarly, Thomas Davis, a carpenter by trade
and one of the survivors of the Whydah wreck (the other, “a black or
native boy of unknown origin,” was sold into slavery), was separately
indicted and tried in Boston on charges of piracy.277
The crew of the Mary Anne was tried on the following four counts
of piracy:
And first, the said [defendants] . . . without lawful Cause or
Warrant, in Hostile manner with Force & Arms, Piratically &
Feloniously did surprise, Assault, Invade, and Enter on the High
Sea . . . a free Trading Vessel or Pink, called the Mary Anne of
Dublin, bound from this Harbour to His Majesty’s Colony of New
York, which said Vessel or Pink was owned by His Majesty’s
Subjects of Ireland, having on board her own Cargoe, and
Navigated by her own Crew, belonging to His Majesty’s Kingdom
aforesaid.
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Bonnet Trial, supra note 236, at 20, 26, 31, 33, 36.
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WOODARD, supra note 1, at 182-85.
WOODARD, supra note 1, at 185-193; The Trials of Eight Persons Indicted for
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HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION, 1660-1730, VOL. 2, 289-313 (Joel H. Baer ed.,
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the “Mary Anne Trial.” We will refer to the separate trial of Thomas Davis as
the “Davis Trial.”
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Secondly, the said [defendants] having in manner aforesaid,
Piratically and Feloniously seize and imprison [the] Master [of the
vessel, and] did force & constrain with five of his Crew to leave
and abandon the said Vessel or Pink, and to go on board a Ship
named the Whido [the Whydah], which Ship was then imployed
and exercised by the said [defendants], and others their
Accomplices and Confederates in continued acts of Piracy &
Robbery on this, and other Coasts of America.
Thirdly, The said [defendants] Did on the day, and at the place
aforesaid, Piratically and Feloniously Imbezil, Spoil and Rob the
Cargoe, of the said Vessel or Pink, consisting chiefly of Wines and
also the Goods & Wearing Apparel of the said Master and his
Crew.
Fourthly, the said [defendants] having at the time and place, and in
manner aforesaid, over powered and subdued the said Master and
his Crew, and made themselves Masters of the said Vessel or Pink,
did then and there Piratically and Feloniously Steer and Direct
their Course after the above-named Piratical Ship, the Whido,
intending to joyn and accompany the same; and thereby, to enable
themselves better to pursue and accomplish their Execrable designs
to oppress the Innocent, and cover the Sea with Depredations and
278
Robberies.

The first, third, and fourth of these counts set forth allegations of
sea robbery, for taking the Mary Anne and her goods, as recognized
under the traditional common law and codified at § VII of An Act for
the More Effectuall Suppression of Piracy. The second count included
allegations of hostility and violence at sea, for capturing and
imprisoning members of the legitimate crew of the Mary Anne, in
violation of § VII of the 1698 Act. The second and fourth counts also
alleged that, subsequent to the taking, the defendants had confederated
with pirates, namely Bellamy and the crew of the Whydah, in violation
of § IX of the 1698 Act. The defendants pleaded not guilty to the
charges and the case proceeded to a bench trial before the judges of the
Admiralty Court.279
In his opening statement, the prosecutor set forth his views on the
crime of piracy, explaining in more articulate fashion than the
prosecutor in the Green Trial, that: “Piracy is in its self a complication
of Treason, Oppression, Murder, Assassination, Robbery, and Theft,
so it denotes the Crime to be perpetrated on the High Sea, or some part
278
279
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thereof, whereby it becomes more Attrocious . . . .”280 The prosecutor
further explained that piracy was more atrocious than the other
enumerated crimes because “of it being committed . . . where the
[crime] cannot easily be prevented nor discovered,”281 and because
“Ships are under the Publick Care” and “It is in the Interest of the
State, that Shipping be Improved.”282 The prosecutor later added that:
“Masters of Ships are Publick Officers, and therefore every Act of
Violence and Spoilation committed on them or their Ships, may justly
be accounted Treason.”283
Unlike in the above-discussed trials, the prosecutor also contended
that an attempted piracy still constituted piracy under the applicable
law, even if the attempt ultimately failed to succeed. The prosecutor
argued
[t]he Man, for instance, who goes armed on purpose to assassinate
or rob [or] attempts to steal, [among other attempted misdeeds] is
in the eye of the Law no less an Assassin or Robber [or] a
Thief . . . than if he had succeeded in the Attempt, and effectnally
completed his design. And consequently the attacking, invading or
entering a free Ship . . . the attempting to Rob or Steal the goods on
board, the offering violence to the Master or his Crew or putting
them under restraint, are so many direct acts of Piracy tho’ there be
no capture nor taking, nor any damage done, and the Aggressor, if
he is overcome and taken on the High Seas, may be lawfully
284
hang’d up at the Yard-Arm. . . .

After summarizing the laws of piracy, the prosecutor turned to the
evidence against the defendants. Doing so, he first summarized and
assessed what several of the defendants had allegedly confessed to a
pre-trial examiner:
They Robb’d the Cargo and Goods on board, and Navigated the
Vessel in company with their Accomplices, who were then
possessed of several Ships and Vessels under the command of the
Capital Ship the Whido, in order to carry Destruction to the utmost
parts of our Territories. The bare naming of these facts is enough
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Id. at 6. To be sure, treason and piracy differ in at least one respect: the
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to prove the first point, viz. That the Facts laid in the Indictment
amount to Piracy, & That the [defendants] are all and each of them
Guilty of these Facts will eventually appear [from the
285
testimony].

Eight witnesses were called to testify as the King’s Evidence.
These witnesses, many of whom were members of the legitimate crew
of the Mary Anne, testified that the defendants had sailed with “the
Whido, whereof Samuel Bellamy a Pirate was Commander,” and that
they were among those who, contending that they had a commission to
take English ships, had boarded the Mary Anne “all Armed with
Musquets, Pistols, and Cutlashes, except [two of them],” threatened
harm to the Mary Anne’s crew, stole wine from the ship’s hold along
with the crew’s extra clothing, and, finally, “made a Prize of” the
vessel, adding it to Bellamy’s fleet.286
In defense, and in similar fashion to the arguments raised by
Bonnet’s crew, all but one of the defendants asserted that Bellamy
and/or other members of the crew had forced them to engage in the
piracies undertaken, and that, though they had never effectuated an
escape, they had been awaiting an opportune moment to do so. 287 The
remaining defendant contended that Bellamy had picked him up while
he was sick, and that he was forced, due to his illness, to remain on the
pirate ship until he was healthy (although he failed to explain why he
remained in the employ of Bellamy upon his cure).288
As with Bonnet and his crew, plunder was the defendants’
downfall. Upon seizure of the Mary Anne, its more valuable contents
had been transferred to the Whydah, and, thus, sank along with the
Whydah in the tempest. But, despite the fact that the crew had not had
an opportunity to, and did not, in fact, share in the plunder, there was
evidence—albeit circumstantial evidence—produced indicating that
the defendants had intended to—indeed, were “intitled” to—share in
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Id. at 8; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-46 (2004)
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the booty aboard the Whydah.289 This evidence, along with the
testimony of the witnesses and the confessions of the crew, led the
Admiralty judges to a finding of guilty as to six of the seven
defendants.290
The remaining defendant, Thomas South, was found not guilty.
The testimony elicited at trial suggested that South had been a sailor
aboard another vessel captured by Bellamy, that he had been held
captive by Bellamy on board the Whydah “utterly against his Will,”
and that, at some point soon after the Mary Anne was captured, South
boarded her, but did so unarmed and in a “civil and peaceable”
manner.291 The evidence also established that South told several
witnesses on multiple occasions, including the members of the
legitimate crew of the Mary Anne, that he intended to escape from
Bellamy at the first opportunity.292 The Admiralty judges were not
persuaded that South was a pirate, and, accordingly, acquitted him of
the charges alleged.293
Thomas Davis was tried separately at the bench on an indictment
similar to the one used in the Mary Anne Trial, but for taking the
Whydah and its goods and imprisoning the legitimate crew of the
Whydah, and for doing the same and more to an unnamed ship and its
crew off the Capes of Virginia (present-day Virginia Beach).294 In
assessing the charges against Davis, the prosecutor argued to the
judges as follows:
To attack a Free trading Ship is unquestionably an act of Piracy,
and the subsequent Facts, viz. Entering on board, seizing and
imprisoning the Master and his Crew, carrying away one Ship &
her Cargoe, and robbing the Cargoe of another, and sinking the
Vessel, are so many distinct Supervening Crimes, which differ
only according to the several degrees of the wrongs and
295
oppressions, which necessarily flow thence.
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Because most of the Whydah crew had perished at sea, and the
only other person to survive the wreck was unavailable to testify at
trial, the prosecutor’s case against Davis was largely circumstantial.
Seven witnesses testified as the King’s Evidence. This testimony
indicated that Davis was detained aboard the Whydah by Bellamy
because “he was a Carpenter & a single Man,” “that [Davis] was very
unwilling to go with Bellamy,” and that Bellamy had promised to
release Davis on the next vessel they intercepted.296 The evidence
further suggested that Davis was not released as promised because the
crew voted to keep him on board due to concern that other captives
would similarly want to be released and because of Davis’s skill set.297
As one witness testified, the crew “[s]wore that they would shoot him
before they would let him go from them.”298
Davis, in his own defense, explained to the judges how he came to
be aboard the Whydah. As summarized by the transcriptionist as
follows:
[Davis] said, That he was Carpenter of the Ship St. Michael
whereof James William was Capt. And Sailed out of Bristol in
Great Britain in the month of Sept. 1716 bound for Jamaica; and in
Decemb. following the Ship was taken about Twenty Leagues off
Sabria by two Pirate Sloops commanded by Capt. Samual
Bellamy, and Monsieur Lebous, who carryed the Ships company to
the Island of Blanco where they were detained till the Nine day of
January last, when he and fourteen other Prisoners were put on
board the Sultan Galley, then under the said Bellamy’s command
who had taken her [previously]: And afterwards took another ship
called the Whido, in which Ship to his great grief & sorrow, he was
forced to come up on this Coast [the North Atlantic], where [the
ship] was cast-away: And he with one John Julian only escaped
Drowning. He further saith, That he was no way active among the
299
Pirates, only as he was compelled by them.

Despite the prosecutor’s subsequent attempts to convince the court
that Davis’s story was a lie, and that he was, indeed, an active member
of Bellamy’s crew,300 the Admiralty judges were not persuaded.
Instead, speaking on behalf of the court, the Chief-Judge explained,
296
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“That there was good proof of [Davis] being forced on board the Pirate
Ship Whido . . . which excused his being with the Pirates; and that
there was no Evidence to prove that he was Accessory with them, but
on the contrary that he was forced to stay with them against his
will.”301
E. The Legacy of Colonial Pirates
Piracy rapidly declined in the latter part of the 1730s, but did not
disappear. Indeed, piracy prosecutions occurred with relative
frequency throughout the early part of the nineteenth century, and in
the United States, continuing concern over the impacts of piracy
during the late 1700s and early 1800s can be seen in the Articles of
Confederation,302 the United States Constitution,303 the Federalist
Papers,304 and early court cases.305 Many of these subsequent
authorities relied on, or were influenced by, the British Colonial
Period’s legal and historical legacy of piracy. For example, in United
States v. Smith, the seminal piracy case on which the Said Court based
its decision, the Supreme Court expressly relied, in part, on the law of
piracy as articulated in the Dawson and Kidd Trials in concluding that
whatever may be the diversity of definitions, in other respects, all
writers concur, in holding, that robbery, or forcible depredations
upon the sea, animo furandi, is piracy. . . . whether we advert to
writers on the common law, or the maritimo law, or the law of
nations, we shall find that they universally treat of piracy as an
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See ART. CONFED. ART. VI (“. . . nor shall any State grant commissions to any
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occasion and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States
in Congress assembled shall determine otherwise.”).
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offence against the law of nations, and that its true definition by
306
that law is robbery upon the sea.

Likewise, many treaties established throughout the next century
built upon the piracy principles introduced during the piracy trials of
the colonial period. For example, the 1778 Treaty of Amity and
Commerce between the United States and France provided the
following:
No Subjects of the Most Christian King [i.e., France] shall apply
for or take any Commission, or Letters of marque, for arming any
Ship or Ships to act as Privateers against the said United States, or
any of them, or against the Subjects People or Inhabitants of the
said United States, or any of them, or against the Property of any
of the Inhabitants of any of them, from any Prince or State with
which the said United States shall be at War. Nor shall any Citizen
Subject or Inhabitant of the said United States, or any of them,
apply for or take any Commission or letters of marque for arming
any Ship or Ships to act as Privateers against the Subjects Of the
most Christian King, or any of them, or the Property of any of
them, from any Prince or State with which the said King shall be at
War: And if any Person of either Nation shall take such
Commissions or Letters of Marque, he shall be punished as a
307
Pirate.

Similarly, the 1794 Jay Treaty provided the following:
And if any Subject or Citizen of the said Parties respectively shall
accept any Foreign Commission or Letters of Marque for Arming
any Vessel to act as a Privateer against the other party, and be
taken by the other party, it is hereby declared to be lawful for the
said party to treat and punish the said Subject or Citizen having
308
such Commission or Letters of Marque as a Pirate.

Indeed, many of the piracy-related criminal law principles first
articulated during the colonial period are found, at least in part, in the
refined piracy definitions set forth in the modern-day criminal codes of
coastal States, as well as the provisions of the 1958 High Seas
Convention and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.309 The
306
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legacy of the colonial period being apparent in these subsequent
authorities, the question arises as to whether and, if so, how this legacy
impacts the present-day classification of UCH as pirate-flagged.
V. QUALIFICATIONS FOR CLASSIFICATION AS PIRATE-FLAGGED
In light of the history recounted in Part IV, it would be incredibly
difficult, if not factually impossible, to retrospectively adjudge certain
acts as piratical in all but three instances. Indeed, under most
circumstances, the surviving legal and historical records are simply too
sparse for modern-day archeologists, historians, lawyers, and others to
determine, with any degree of precision or certainty, whether someone
was a pirate as opposed to a privateer, or whether certain acts fell
within the scope of the piracy definitions recognized under the
common law or by statute. This does not, however, mean that the legal
and historical record is of no use. Instead, as noted above and set forth
below, there are three instances in which it is appropriate to classify
UCH as pirate-flagged.
A. Circumstances Appropriate for Classification of
Underwater Cultural Heritage as Pirate-Flagged
1. Conviction of the Captain
Of the trials examined above, four resulted in a ship’s
commander—who is generally referred to as a “captain”—being
convicted of piracy: the Kidd Trial (Captain William Kidd); the Green
Trial (Captain Thomas Green); the Quelch Trial (Captain John
Quelch); and the Bonnet Trial (Captain Major Stede Bonnet). These
examples suggest that pirate captains typically obtained authority and
control over the vessels under their command in one of three ways.
First, some captains, such as Kidd and Green, held legitimate
commanding posts aboard validly commissioned privateering or
merchant vessels but nonetheless became pirate captains when they
and their crews committed piratical acts during a commissioned
voyage.310 Second, other captains, such as Quelch, were
democratically elected to a commanding post by the majority of a
310

See ZACKS, supra note 7, at 103-06; Green Trial, supra note 210, at 27. This
occurred most often when the captain and/or crew acted outside the scope of the
authority granted to them by their commission, a fairly common occurrence
during the late 1600s to early 1700s. See, e.g., RUBIN, supra note 121, 78-80, 99.
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vessel’s pirate crew after taking control of the vessel by mutiny or
illicit capture.311 Third, a relative few, including Bonnet, privately
commissioned their own vessels, declaring themselves commander, in
order to pursue piratical endeavors.312
For purposes of the instant analysis, the method by which the
pirate captain obtained authority and control over the ship is
unimportant. Instead, under both the 1958 High Seas and 1982
Conventions, the important determination in assessing whether a ship
is a pirate ship is whether the ship was under the “dominant control” of
pirates.313 In all three instances highlighted above, the captain’s
piratical actions were representative of those in dominant control of
the ship. In the first and third scenarios, where the captain held a
legitimate rank prior to turning pirate and continued in said role
thereafter, and where the captain commissioned and commanded his
own vessel, the captain often retained control of the ship only by
courting the continuing support of the crew.314 Similarly, in the
remaining scenario, where the captain was democratically elected by
the majority of his or her pirate crew to command a vessel illicitly
seized, the captain generally acted in accordance with the will of the
crew on threat of deposition.315 These observations suggest that, in the
event a captain is adjudged a pirate, the vessel under his or her
command should properly be deemed a pirate ship.
The most reliable way to determine if a captain was a pirate is to
look to the trial records of the applicable time period to determine
whether the captain was convicted of committing acts of piracy.
Indeed, absent a piracy conviction (or, as discussed below, an official
pardon), the only remaining option is to attempt to retrospectively
apply the rule set forth in Hasan/Dire to the captain’s actions—i.e.,
attempt to discern, based on the historical record, whether the captain
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committed acts of piracy pursuant to the laws of piracy in effect at the
time of the alleged transgression—a task which, based on the record
left to us by ages past, is nearly impossible to do with any degree of
precision or certainty.316 Of course, we recognize that historians and
legal commentators often criticize the processes used and laws applied
in early pirate trials, the Kidd Trial being one of the most prevalent
examples.317 And, as this article explored in Part III, the records of
many early piracy trials, including the Kidd Trial, the Quelch Trial,
and the Green Trial, among others, certainly contain what, to our
modern senses, appears to be unfairness, violations of due process and
other inherent rights, and/or omissions or defects in the law as
applied.318 But, despite their flaws, the past trials of those convicted of
piracy represent our best opportunity to fairly judge an alleged pirate
captain in accordance with the laws of piracy in effect at the time of
the alleged piratical offense.
Applying these conclusions to UCH discerns the following rule: if
UCH was, at the time of its demise, captained by an individual later
convicted of committing acts of piracy using the vessel, said UCH is
properly classified as pirate-flagged.
However, although an effective mechanism to determine whether
UCH should be deemed pirate-flagged, a captain’s conviction is not,
and cannot be, the sole criteria for such a classification. Indeed, were
we to apply this standard exclusively, vessels commanded by some
who were most certainly pirates, including, for example, Henry Avery,
Sam Bellamy, and Blackbeard, none of whom stood trial for their
offenses, would be excluded. To remedy this apparent inadequacy, this
article proposes two additional circumstances under which UCH can
be appropriately classified as pirate-flagged.
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2. Conviction of a Large Number of the Crew under the
Captain’s Command
As with pirate captains, the convictions of a large number of the
crew of a vessel used to commit acts of piracy demonstrate that the
ship was under the dominant authority and control of pirates. Most, if
not all, pirate ships operated as small-scale democratic institutions
where decisions were made by majority vote of the pirate crew in all
circumstances but during the heat of battle, when the captain held
overriding authority.319 Put another way, the decision to engage in
piratical acts represented, not only the decision of the captain, but also
the will of the majority of the crew.320 The dissenting members of the
crew were expected to act in accordance with the will of the majority,
on threat of physical harm or other punishment, such as being
marooned on an island or set adrift in the ship’s boat.321 Thus, the
conviction of a large number of a vessel’s crew for committing acts of
piracy establishes that the majority of the crew—those in dominant
control—acquiesced in the piratical activities undertaken, even if
particular individuals did not. Such convictions are, therefore,
sufficiently reliable indicators that the vessel used by those convicted
was a pirate ship.
In such an analysis, it is important to accurately distinguish
between members of a pirate crew, on one hand, and other individuals
serving aboard a pirate ship, on the other. As demonstrated by the
Kidd Trial, the Bonnet Trial, and the Mary Anne Trial, among others,
slaves, servants, and captives were often acquitted of the piracy
charges brought against them—even if they had, in fact, participated in
the piratical offenses alleged—due to their lack of willful participation
in the overall piratical enterprise.322 The acquittal of such individuals
should be understood in proper legal and historical context, as set forth
above, and should not be interpreted as establishing that the majority
of a ship’s crew lacked piratical intent or that a ship used to commit
piratical offenses was something other than a pirate ship. As noted
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above, in some pirate trial transcripts, the classification of such
persons—slaves, servants, or captives—are clearly indicated. In other
cases, the classification of the person acquitted can be gleaned from
the jury instructions given, or the arguments presented to the court.323
Likewise, it is necessary to distinguish between the actions of a
large number of the crew versus those of a small minority. This is
because some piratical offenses, such as, for example, attempted
mutiny, delivering certain types of seducing or threatening messages,
or soliciting others to turn pirate, are capable of being effectuated
solely by individuals, or a small group of individuals, contrary to the
will of a legitimately commissioned crew.324 In most circumstances,
this distinction is readily discernable from the allegations as charged in
the indictment. Indeed, most piracy indictments expressly alleged that
the defendants, with the assistance of the other members of the crew,
illicitly seized one or more ships as part of a larger piratical enterprise,
and prosecutors often emphasized these facts during trial.325 In
contrast, where an indictment or trial transcript indicates that an
individual acted alone, or with the help of one or two others, such facts
fail to establish that the piratical individuals were in dominant control
of a vessel, and, thus, that the vessel was a pirate ship.
To summarize, the conviction of a large number of a ship’s crew
for piracy indicates that the vessel used to commit said acts is properly
deemed a pirate ship. If the UCH sank while under the dominant
authority and control of said crew, it is rightfully classified as pirateflagged. In making this determination, the intentions and actions of
slaves, servants, and captives should not be imputed to the crew, nor
should those of a distinct few.
3. Begging the King’s Pardon
On several occasions during the British Colonial Period, monarchs
and other authorized government officials issued official pardons
forgiving the piracies of those who, confessing their piratical activities,
turned themselves in to proper authorities. The most famous of these
pardons, King George I’s “PROCLAMATION for Suppressing of
PYRATES,” provided:
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See, e.g., Offences at Sea Act, 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15, §§ VII-X (1698) (Eng.).
See, e.g., Bonnet Trial, supra note 236 at 3, 9, 7, 16.
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And we do hereby promise, and declare, that in Case any of the
said Pyrates, shall on, or before, the 5 th of September, in the Year
of our Lord 1718, surrender him or themselves, to one of our
Principal Secretaries of State in Great Britain or Ireland, or to any
Governor or Deputy Governor of any of our Plantations beyond the
Seas; every such Pyrate and Pyrates so surrounding him, or
themselves, as aforesaid, shall have our gracious Pardon, of, and
for such, his or their Pyracy, or Pyracies, by him to them
326
committed, before the fifth of January next ensuring.

As with a conviction, those who begged and received the King’s
Pardon are rightfully adjudged pirates for purposes of classifying UCH
as pirate-flagged. Accepting an official pardon was tantamount to
pleading guilty to allegations of piracy in return for a commuted
sentence. Those who surrendered to such proclamations in proper
fashion were given a certificate of pardon, their names were placed on
an official list of pardoned pirates, and they were released to continue
about their daily lives.327
Many of the most famous pirates, including Benjamin Hornigold,
Blackbeard, Stede Bonnet, and Charles Vane accepted pardons at
some point during their piratical careers.328 Some, such as Blackbeard,
Bonnet, and Vane, thereafter returned to piracy.329 Others, including
Hornigold, accepted their forgiveness as a profound opportunity and
became, instead, honest privateers or merchantmen (in appearance, at
least).330 However, regardless of their post-pardon activities, all who
accepted the King’s Pardon are rightfully adjudged pirates, even if
they did not ultimately stand trial or receive punishment for their
misdeeds. It follows then that if a ship’s captain took the pardon, or a
large number of a ship’s crew took the pardon, the ship is properly
deemed a pirate ship. If under the dominant authority and control of
said persons at the time of its demise, the ship is properly categorized
as pirate-flagged.
It is worth noting that, unlike in the trials of a captain or his crew,
where the indictments, evidence, or argument often disclosed the
vessels used by the defendants to commit piratical activities, no
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judicial record exists with respect to the vessels so employed by those
who took the King’s Pardon. This does not mean, however, that it is
impossible to determine if those in dominant control used a particular
vessel for piratical purposes. Even though recourse to the historical
record is, admittedly, more difficult, it is not impossible to accurately
determine whether a ship was under the dominant authority and
control of those who begged the King’s Pardon.331
B. Circumstances Insufficient for Classification of Underwater
Cultural Heritage as Pirate-Flagged
1. By Proclamation
Colonial governors or others in positions of authority often issued
proclamations identifying certain individuals as pirates.332 Such
proclamations identified Avery, Kidd, Blackbeard, and Calico Jack,
among others, as pirates.333 For example, one of the governors’
proclamations (there were several) so identifying Captain Kidd
ordered that Kidd be detained “to the end that he and his accomplices
may be prosecuted for the notorious piracies they have committed in
the East Indies.”334
The proclamation declaring Calico Jack to be a pirate read:
“[T]he said John Rackum [i.e., Calico Jack] and his said Company are
hereby proclaimed Pirates and Enemies to the Crown of Great Britain,
and are to be so treated and Deem’d by all his Majesty’s subjects.”335
Governor Alexander Spotswood’s declaration naming Blackbeard
as a pirate provided:
[T]hat all and every person or persons who . . . shall take any
Pyrate . . . or, in the Case of Resistance, shall kill any such
Pyrate . . . upon the Conviction, or making due Proof of the killing
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Id. at 158 (noting that one or more ships once captained by Hornigold lay
wrecked along the coast of Nassau, Bahamas).
CORDINGLY, supra note 139, at 206; see, e.g., WOODARD, supra note 1, at 143
(King-issued declaration named certain individuals as pirates).
See, e.g., CORDINGLY, supra note 139, at 58 (describing governor’s
proclamation declaring Calico Jack and others as pirates); JOHNSON, supra note
14, at 78-79 (quoting Governor Spotswood’s proclamation declaring Blackbeard
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Captains Avery and Kidd as pirates).
ZACKS, supra note 7, at 210.
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of all, and every such Pyrate . . . shall be entitled to have . . . the
several Rewards following: . . . for Edward Teach, commonly
336
called Captain Teach, or Black-beard, one hundred Pounds. . . .

Proclamations of these varieties are not sufficiently reliable
indictors that a captain or members of a crew were, in fact, pirates. In
contrast to a conviction for piracy in a court of law, or a confession of
piracy via taking the King’s Pardon, an official proclamation involved
neither a presentation of facts nor a confession. Many proclamations
were vaguely worded and often premised on nothing more than
hearsay or rumor. Indeed, there exist valid arguments that some
proclamations, such as those declaring Kidd to be a pirate, were based
entirely on mischaracterized or inaccurate facts, or, contrary to their
intentions, forced legitimate privateers into piracy by blacklisting their
names.337
2. Retrospective Adjudication
As discussed above, the surviving legal and historical records are
simply too sparse to determine, with any degree of certainty, whether
an individual was a pirate as opposed to a privateer, or whether certain
acts fell within the scope of the piracy definitions recognized under the
applicable statutes or common law in effect at the time of the alleged
offense. Attempts to engage in such retrospective adjudications should
be avoided as unreliable and ineffective.
VI. THE WHYDAH
Applying the aforesaid conclusions to the Whydah demonstrates
that the ship, its contents, and its wreck site are properly classified as
pirate-flagged UCH. There can be little doubt that the Whydah is
properly classified as UCH. The ship sank on April 16, 1717, more
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than 100 years ago, and provides unique cultural, historical,
archaeological, and scientific opportunities.338 Although Bellamy
perished in the wreck without standing trial for his alleged misdeeds, a
large enough contingent of the crew serving aboard vessels in his fleet
were so convicted, as memorialized in the transcript of the Mary Anne
Trial.339 The subsequent acquittal of Thomas Davis, a captive aboard
the Whydah, does not change the ship’s proper classification.340
Finally, the Whydah was, at the time of its capture, a merchant slave
trader and not a sovereign vessel of any variety.341 These observations
establish that the Whydah is properly pirate-flagged UCH.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has established that classifying underwater cultural
heritage as pirate-flagged is consistent, not only with the historical and
archeological reality that pirates sailed and wrecked what is now UCH,
but also with the piracy and archeological protection provisions found
in international conventions such as the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the 2001
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural
Heritage. This classification is appropriately applied to non-sovereign
UCH in cases where the UCH was under the dominant authority and
control of pirates at the time of its demise, and to other UCH in like
circumstances if the laws of the sovereign expressly permit such a
classification or the sovereign has expressly abandoned the UCH.
In assessing whether these standards are satisfied with respect to
particular UCH, retroactive piracy adjudications should be avoided
except where the captain or a large contingent of the crew were
convicted of committing acts of piracy using the vessel, or took the
King’s Pardon for acts committed using the vessel. In making this
determination, it is important to distinguish between the actions of the
crew, as opposed to those of slaves, servants, or captives, because the
standard is neither triggered nor affected by the involvement of those
participating in piratical endeavors against their will. For similar
338
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reasons, it is important to distinguish between the actions of a majority
of the crew from those of an individual or a distinct minority. As with
slaves, servants, and captives, neither the actions of an individual nor
those of an identifiable minority affect the proper classification of
UCH. Lastly, it is important to recognize that official piracy
proclamations, by kings, governors, or other authorized government
officials, are not sufficiently reliable indicators of the subject’s
involvement in piracy to justify classifying UCH as pirate-flagged.
Pursuant to these standards, the wreck site of the Whydah is
properly classified as pirate-flagged UCH. It was a non-sovereign
vessel that was, at the time of its demise, under the dominant control
and authority of a sufficiently large contingent of persons convicted of
committing acts of piracy using the vessel. Other examples of pirateflagged UCH abound. Some, such as Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s
Revenge, have already been discovered. Others remain to be located or
identified. In either case, the aforementioned standards provide the
most legally and historically appropriate way to determine whether the
wreck of a vessel and its contents are properly classified as pirateflagged UCH.
These standards are also helpful in identifying what will eventually
become pirate-flagged UCH in the future. Pirates continue to be active
in the world’s seas, especially in the South China Sea and off the coast
of Africa, and continue to wreck their vessels and lose their cargo.
Meanwhile, the piracy laws governing these illicit activities continue
to change and evolve, and those implicated in piratical endeavors will,
as the Dire Court recognized, ultimately be prosecuted according to
the definitions of piracy in effect at the time the alleged transgressions
were committed. In light of the inevitable evolution of the applicable
piracy standards, the most legally and historically sound method of
determining whether the wreck of a vessel or its contents is
appropriately classified as pirate-flagged will in future times, as is
presently the case, continue to be: 1) if the captain was convicted of
piracy; 2) if a large enough contingent of the crew was so convicted;
or 3) if the captain and/or a large number of the crew received a
pardon forgiving their piratical misdeeds. Indeed, because even the
most generous historic preservation laws recognize that wrecked
vessels and/or their contents must be at least 50 years old—and often
at least 100 years old—to meet the threshold for qualification as UCH,
the determination of whether a particular wreck site should be
classified as pirate-flagged will most likely be made in an age farremoved from the period in which the piratical offenses were
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committed, and well after the piracy definitions applicable to those
offenses, or the interpretations thereof, have evolved in one way or
another.

